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ABSTRACT
The struggle to reconcile individual liberty with the need for collective enterprise, a perennial question at law, has
been particularly acute of late. In cases like Citizens United v. FEC, Harris v. Quinn, and Burwell v.
Hobby Lobby, the Supreme Court has re-assessed dissenters’ ability to exit various joint funding schemes,
raising questions about the limits of group activity and the power of the government to address systemic problems.
Many litigants asserting “opt-out” rights argue that a challenged law forces them to subsidize speech in violation
of the First Amendment. The Court’s recent responses to such claims have both departed from precedent and
revealed deep inconsistencies in the doctrine. These tensions are captured in the Paycheck Problem, which contemplates a public employee who has strong feelings on a matter of public policy yet is required to financially
support speech contrary to his views through his taxes, union agency fee, and pension contribution. The Article
reviews the trajectory of the Supreme Court’s cases in these areas and demonstrates how the Court’s recent decisions
sharply diverge in the opt-out rights provided in the union and corporate contexts. In addition to doctrinal tensions
previously observed with regard to individuals forced to subsidize an organization’s political spending (allowed in
the corporate context but prohibited for unions), this Article observes that the Court’s recent rulings could be read
to give a dissenting corporate shareholder a First Amendment claim based on a vast array of corporate activities
traditionally subject to the most deferential of judicial review. Among other things, such a conclusion would deeply
destabilize public pensions.
This is not an argument for First Amendment anarchy, but for a new limiting principle, which the Article demonstrates through adding to the existing union and corporate law conversations an analysis of the Court’s tax and
government speech cases, in which the Court has reached the right result but not for the right reasons. The Article
concludes by outlining three possible paths forward at a time when the Supreme Court, with a new Justice in
place, finds itself at a crossroads on these questions.
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INTRODUCTION
If one is in search of a unifying theory of the First Amendment, it is best
to keep moving past the Supreme Court’s compelled subsidy of speech cases.
In recent years litigants have beaten a regular path to the Court asserting a
constitutional right to avoid contributing funds to various collective
schemes—most of which are designed to benefit the litigants themselves—
because they object to an expressive component of the challenged program.1
Although the Court has now had the opportunity to consider similar arguments across a range of contexts, its pronouncements in this area have not
coalesced around any organizing principle to determine if and when the First
Amendment requires that collective enterprises provide their participants

1

See, e.g., Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 553 (2005) (“For the third time in eight
years, we consider whether a Federal program that finances generic advertising to promote an agricultural product violates the First Amendment.”); Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2643 (2014)
(addressing a challenge to mandatory fees for a quasi-public union); Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers
Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016) (per curiam) (addressing a challenge to mandatory fees for a public
union), reh’g denied, 136 S. Ct. 2545 (2016).
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exit rights. If anything, the Court’s lines of analysis have become ever more
difficult to reconcile.2 This has implications for both constitutional theory
and organizational practice.
This Article explores the Court’s compelled subsidy jurisprudence
through reference to a hypothetical—but hardly far-fetched—real-world scenario. Imagine a state police officer, Sam. Every month, Sam’s paycheck
reflects several automatic deductions, including federal tax withholdings, union dues, and a mandatory contribution to the state’s pension fund. Like
many state law enforcement officers, Sam works in a unionized workplace.3
He was once a union supporter, but now he strongly disagrees with his union’s
support for body-worn cameras (“BWCs”).4 Sam can opt out of full union
membership if he wishes to withdraw his support from the union’s political
activities, but he still must pay a reduced monthly amount as an agency or
“fair share” fee to cover a pro rata portion of the services the union is required
to provide to all employees, such as training, grievance procedures, contract
administration, and collective bargaining—the very bargaining process in
which the union is negotiating for widespread adoption of BWCs.5 To pour
salt on a wound, Sam has recently learned that his state pension fund, to
which he is also required to contribute, is invested in a leading manufacturer
of BWCs.6 This company has lobbied for public BWC funding, run advertisements in favor of politicians who support widespread adoption of BWCs,
and negotiated contracts with state and federal governments for the purchase
of additional BWCs and support services. Finally, Sam is also upset that the
federal government is promoting BWCs and has proposed spending millions
of dollars—including his tax dollars—to increase their use.7

2
3

4

5
6

7

See infra Part II.
News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Union Members—2016 (Jan. 26,
2017) [hereinafter BLS 2015 Labor Data], https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf; see
also Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Police and Detectives, OCCUPATIONAL
OUTLOOK HANDBOOK, https://www.bls.gov/ooh/protective-service/police-and-detectives.
htm#tab-5 (last updated Oct. 24, 2017) (“Most police and detectives belonged to a union in 2016.”).
See, e.g., Roy Klabin, The Case Against Police Body Cameras, DAILY BANTER (May 13, 2015),
http://thedailybanter.com/2015/05/the-case-against-police-body-cameras/ (noting some law enforcement, civil liberty, and public administration objections to pervasive use of police body cameras); Janet Vertesi, The Problem with Police Body Cameras, TIME (May 4, 2015), http://time.com/
3843157/the-problem-with-police-body-cameras/ (explaining via case studies how video evidence
frequently fails to provide objective clarity to the factfinder).
See infra note 98.
See Ben Geier, Body Cam Stocks Are Soaring After Obama Urges Greater Use by Police, FORTUNE (Dec. 2,
2014), http://fortune.com/2014/12/02/taser-obama-congress-ferguson/ (indicating that BWC
manufacturers are often both publicly traded and appealing investments); Rich Smith, Body Cameras
for Police: How They Work, Who Makes Them, and Stocks You Can Buy, MOTLEY FOOL (Sept. 14, 2014,
12:17 PM), https://www.fool.com/investing/general/2014/09/14/body-cameras-for-policehow-they-work-who-makes-th.aspx.
See Fact Sheet: Strengthening Community Policing, THE WHITE HOUSE: OFFICE OF THE PRESS SEC’Y (Dec.
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Sam does not want his money to support any of these expressive activities.
The Constitution protects Sam’s right to speak his mind on BWCs.8 Does it
also give him the right to refuse to pay his taxes, union fees, and pension
contribution because these payments constitute the compelled subsidy of
speech that he opposes? Is there a principled way to reconcile the Court’s
rulings in this area?
This is the Paycheck Problem, and it provides a compact and timely platform from which to examine shifts that the Supreme Court has signaled in
its recent First Amendment rulings and consider our own intuitions about
money, speech, and the Constitution. It is compact because, although spanning three areas of law, the hypothetical removes from the First Amendment
analysis considerations of state action or compulsion; both are assumed.9 It
is timely because in recent years the question of “opt-out rights” has assumed
an ever more prominent role in public debate and in the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence.10 Indeed, the death of Justice Antonin Scalia left unresolved
one of the very questions presented in the Paycheck Problem: whether a public employee can be required to pay an agency fee to a union that represents
him but that he has declined to join.11 In late September 2017, as this Article

8

9

10

11

1, 2014), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/12/01/fact-sheet-strengtheningcommunity-policing (including increased use of police body cameras among its recommendations).
He may not, however, have the right to both keep his job and speak his mind. Garcetti v. Ceballos,
547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006) (“[W]hen public employees make statements pursuant to their official
duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline.”).
I also leave to one side the opt-in/opt-out question and the question of state restrictions on union
payroll deductions. See Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass’n, 555 U.S. 353, 355 (2009) (upholding a state
law that allowed public-sector unions to collect general union dues but not support for its political
activities through payroll deductions); Brian Olney, Paycheck Protection or Paycheck Deception? When Government “Subsidies” Silence Political Speech, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 881, 909 (2014) (critiquing Ysursa as
inconsistent with other First Amendment rulings).
See Adam B. Cox & Adam M. Samaha, Unconstitutional Conditions Questions Everywhere: The Implications
of Exit and Sorting for Constitutional Law and Theory, 5 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 62, (2013) (arguing that nearly
every constitutional issue can be framed as a question of unconstitutional conditions, and that “placing exit and sorting at the center of constitutional law, rather than at its periphery, opens new
directions for constitutional theory in the United States”); Robin West, A Tale of Two Rights, 94 B.U.
L. REV. 893, 894–95 (2014) (“At the heart of the new paradigm of constitutional rights . . . is a right
to ‘opt out’ of some central public or civic project. . . . The particular exit rights that I enumerate—
that is, the rights to exit from the benefits and responsibilities of public projects, including public
education, publicly funded policing, civil rights commitments, and public health projects—harm
civil society in profound ways not appreciated by rights critics in the 1970s and 1980s.”).
Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016) (deadlocking 4-4 on a case that sought to
overturn longstanding precedent upholding public union agency fees for activity related to the union’s required duties); see Adam Liptak, In Judge Neil Gorsuch, an Echo of Scalia in Philosophy and Style,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/31/us/politics/neil-gorsuch-supreme-court-nominee.html?_r=0 (discussing Justice Neil Gorsuch’s views and their relationship to
the balance of power on key issues before the Court).
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was going to press, the Supreme Court again granted certiorari on that issue
in Janus v. AFSCME Council 31.12
Justice Scalia joined with those Justices on the Roberts Court who have
taken an increasingly robust interpretation of the First Amendment’s exhortation that the government “shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech,”13 and in many ways the story of the Paycheck Problem is the story
of the Court’s shifting First Amendment analysis.14 As described below, in
recent decades the Court has expanded the scope of speech covered by the
First Amendment, it has elided the distinction between direct and indirect
restrictions on speech, and it has increasingly focused on the burden to individual autonomy that speech restrictions impose rather than their impact on
public discourse.15 Each of these trends has a special resonance in the context
of compelled speech (as opposed to direct speech restrictions), and each has
contributed to the Court’s increased skepticism towards collective funding
initiatives. Taken together, these shifts have sparked concerns that the current Court is using the First Amendment as a deregulatory hatchet much the
way that the Lochner-era Court once employed due process and freedom of
contract.16 The concern is particularly acute where, as with taxes, unions, or
pensions, the challenged program represents a collective effort to address a
diffuse but significant societal issue.
Yet this First Amendment “dismantling” has been piecemeal and inconsistent. For example, in recent years the Court has relied on the First Amendment to re-visit the question of whether employees can be required to fund
public-sector unions’ collective bargaining activities, challenging decades-old

12
13
14
15
16

851 F.3d 746 (7th Cir. 2017), cert. granted sub nom., Janus v. Am. Fed’n, 138 S. Ct. 54 (mem.); see infra
notes 134, 360.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
See Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618 (2014) (holding, in a majority opinion which Justice Scalia
joined, mandatory agency fees for a quasi-public union violated First Amendment).
See infra Parts I.A–B.
See, e.g., Susan Crawford, First Amendment Common Sense, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2343, 2345 (2014) (warning that “to apply a heightened First Amendment standard when a court is reviewing an ordinary
economic regulatory program, merely because there may be some indirect effect on private speech
caused by the challenged regulations, would return us to the Lochner era and sharply undermine congressional authority”); Leslie Kendrick, First Amendment Expansionism, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1199,
1207 (2015) (“In the early twentieth century, businesses articulated similar antiregulatory sentiment
in other terms. This was the Lochner era. . . . [I]n their structure, the claims of the past resemble those
of the present.”); Robert Post, Compelled Commercial Speech, 117 W. VA. L. REV. 867, 880 (2015) (“Virtually all commercial transactions are consummated through contracts, and all contracts exist in the
medium of language. If the First Amendment were interpreted to endow commercial speakers with
autonomy interests in the words of their contracts, Lochner would be revived.”); Amanda Shanor, The
New Lochner, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 133, 135 (“[A] growing number of scholars, commentators, and
judges have likened aspects of recent First Amendment jurisprudence to Lochner v. New York’s anticanonical liberty of contract.” (citing Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905))).
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case law allowing such assessments. 17 Even as it has shown solicitude for the
First Amendment interests of union-shop employees, however, the Court has
struck down laws protecting the constitutional interests of corporate shareholders, whose investments now may be channeled by corporations into independent political expenditures with which the shareholder may disagree.18
This Article joins with recent scholarship that examines the tension between the Court’s treatment of compelled support for union political activities, on the one hand, and corporate political activities, on the other.19 Unions have long been barred from using their mandatory fees for political
expenditures unrelated to the union’s core responsibilities. Political activities
must be funded by additional voluntary contributions, payment of which
makes one a full union member rather than just a “covered” or “agency
shop” employee. In the 1977 case Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, the Court
explained that this arrangement safeguards employees’ core First Amendment rights.20 Yet in its 2010 decision in Citizens United v. FEC, the Supreme
Court broke with precedent to allow corporations to use unlimited general
treasury funds on independent political advertisements.21 Surely, commentators argued, the First Amendment rights of shareholders and pension fund
members are likewise jeopardized when corporations use their investments
for political purposes.22 The emphasis in the scholarship to date has been on
finding a pragmatic work-around to this dilemma, such as disclosure of corporate political spending or a change in union structure.23 A related analysis

17

18

19

20
21
22

23

See, e.g., Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2643 (holding mandatory agency fees for a quasi-public union violated
First Amendment). While the Court has restricted its analysis to public-sector unions, it would not
be difficult to extend its logic to private unions.
See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 362 (finding that restrictions on “electioneering
communications” by corporations chill speech protected by the First Amendment). But see Burwell
v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759–60 (2014) (citing the rights of individual shareholders to the free exercise of religion, as protected by the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42
U.S.C. § 2000bb, in overturning the Affordable Care Act’s contraception mandate for closely-held
corporations).
See generally Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Corporate Political Speech: Who Decides?, 124
HARV. L. REV. 83 (2010); Eric John Finseth, Shareholder Activism by Public Pension Funds and the Rights
of Dissenting Employees Under the First Amendment, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 289, 344 (2011) (article
published prior to changing name to Eric John Finseth Alden); Benjamin I. Sachs, Unions, Corporations, and Political Opt-Out Rights After Citizens United, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 800 (2012).
Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 229 (1977).
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 365.
See, e.g., Catherine L. Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, Political Speech and Association Rights After Knox v.
SEIU, Local 1000, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1023, 1024–25 (2013) (“Citizens United v.
FEC . . . dismissed in a few sentences the idea that corporate leadership’s use of corporate resources
on politics might infringe on the rights of dissenting shareholders.”). See generally Victor Brudney,
Business Corporations and Stockholders’ Rights Under the First Amendment, 91 YALE L.J. 235 (1981) (discussing, in the first major piece of scholarship to address this issue, whether First Amendment rights are
extended to stockholders during the corporate decisionmaking process); Sachs, supra note 19.
See supra note 18; see also Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Taking Opt-in Rights Seriously: What Knox v. SEIU
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proposes that employees contributing to a public pension should have the
right to withhold funds for a pro rata portion of the shares voted by pension
boards to advance a political or ideological purpose (for example, a resolution
promoting a diverse board of directors or a shareholder proposal introducing
corporate climate change objectives).24
This Article argues that there are even more significant implications of
the Court’s holdings that cannot be remedied by the thoughtful solutions already proposed. Since Citizens United, the Court has moved the even further
from its traditional balancing approach, holding that compelled subsidies impose a First Amendment burden akin to compelled speech itself and articulating a broad definition of speech that one cannot be compelled to fund,
sweeping into its ambit the kind of speech that corporations engage in quite
regularly—for example, speech that might impact a federal or state budget.25
These decisions parallel the approach the Court has taken in recent cases
challenging speech restrictions (as opposed to compelled contributions),
which increasingly apply a heightened or “exacting” level of scrutiny to laws
affecting even routine commercial speech.26 Taking the Court at its word
would imply that it is not only corporations’ newfound ability to engage in
overtly political speech that may create a First Amendment cause of action
for shareholders, but also business activities that we have traditionally viewed
as existing in a corporate law sphere quite separate from constitutional law
inquiries, such as contract negotiations and lobbying initiatives. At the very
least, the Court’s recent holdings make one struggle to identify constitutionally meaningful grounds to distinguish pension contributions from agency
fees for the purposes of a compelled speech analysis. If Sam can withhold his
union agency fee, why can he not also withhold his pension contribution?
The Paycheck Problem does not insist on false equivalencies, but it does
surface significant similarities in an effort to bring some rigor to an area of
jurisprudence long recognized as inconsistent and haphazard.27 Union
agency fees, pension contributions, and taxes rest in distinct legal fields, but

24
25

26
27

Could Mean for Post-Citizens United Shareholder Rights, 74 MONT. L. REV. 101, 127 (2013).
See Finseth Alden, supra note 19, at 344.
See Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2643 (2014) (holding that one may not be compelled to subsidize a quasi-public union’s speech because, inter alia, it addresses maters of public concern, such
as potential increases in state Medicaid expenditures, which could impact the state budget).
See infra Part I.A.
Steven D. Smith, Barnette’s Big Blunder, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 625, 662 (2003) (criticizing the
Court’s application of West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), as resulting in
“a jurisprudence of deception and inconsistency—one that sporadically strikes down the occasional
governmental act or pronouncement for violating the Barnette prohibitions while more often winking
at (or explaining away or, most often, simply not noticing) massive transgressions”); see also Fisk &
Chemerinsky, supra note 22, at 1052 (“[E]ven in the area of compelled contributions, the Court has
been markedly inconsistent in deciding whether there is a First Amendment violation.”).
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the parallels among them, particularly between union and pensions, are such
that the Court’s current First Amendment cases make it surprisingly challenging to identify a distinguishing line that reflects something other than
scale or degree (or pure policy preference).28 The practical difficulties of reconciling the Court’s holdings thus expose a more theoretical conundrum: applying the Court’s recent compelled subsidy of speech jurisprudence across
the range of relevant contexts would be societally destabilizing, but treating
each challenge as a discrete occasion to announce a new rule of law would
be constitutionally erratic.
To resolve this paradox, this Article brings into the analysis the Court’s
“government speech” line of cases, which announced a blanket rule barring
First Amendment challenges to any assessments that could be considered a
federal tax—a theoretically unmoored move that at least one scholar deemed
a judicial “ipse dixit”—and reconsiders them to identify a more principled
basis for decision in the area of compelled subsidies.29 The goal is not to arrive
at the same outcome for each of the three areas in which Sam wants to withhold his financial support, but to locate a consistent rationale for determining
when the Constitution requires cooperative endeavors to allow opt-outs.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides an overview of the relevant case law that analyzes the constitutionality of compelled subsidies in
each of these three areas—taxes, unions, and pensions—with particular attention to more recent cases that expand the First Amendment penumbra
and emphasize the role of the First Amendment in protecting individual autonomy. Part II engages with the question at the heart of the Paycheck Problem: are compelled payments in these three areas constitutionally distinguishable? It examines grounds for treating pensions differently from unions for
First Amendment purposes, considering both factors suggested by other
scholars and proposing new ones. It then looks at the explanations the Court
has offered in rejecting a right to opt out of taxes and questions why these
justifications would not apply equally well to union agency fees and pension
contributions. The Article concludes, among other things, that union agency
fees and pension contributions create a similar First Amendment burden for
a dissenter, yet the Court treats them quite differently. Conversely, taxes
truly are different, but the Court has not articulated a theory—other than

28

29

Cf. Catherine L. Fisk & Margaux Poueymirou, Harris v. Quinn and the Contradictions of Compelled
Speech, 48 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 439, 461 (2014) (“[W]hat is amusing about Harris is that it is the Republican-appointed Justices who are both activist and anti-state’s rights here, substituting their policy views about the importance of certain labor contract terms for those of the Illinois legislature
and governor about a matter of state governance.”); Michele Gilman, A Court for the One Percent: How
the Supreme Court Contributes to Economic Inequality, 3 UTAH L. REV. 389, 419 (2014) (comparing, inter
alia, union political activity cases with corporate political activity cases).
See Robert Post, Compelled Subsidization of Speech: Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Association, 2005
SUP. CT. REV. 195, 197 (2005).
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sheer size—that this is so. This is because the Court has failed to offer a
consistent theory of what the First Amendment protects and why.
These discussions illustrate the need to identify a new limiting principle in
First Amendment compelled subsidy of speech cases. The final Part takes up
this challenge. Part III suggests three ways the Court might move forward with
its First Amendment jurisprudence. It could fall back and regroup around a
workable definition of protected speech, degree of burden, and levels of scrutiny
(the “functional” path); it could embrace its current expansive approach as to
both speech coverage and individual autonomy, which would require adding
to its current analysis an acknowledgment of the potential First Amendment
harm that opt-outs pose to others participating in a cooperative enterprise (the
“individual” path); or it could re-focus its First Amendment jurisprudence to
advance the operational purpose of the First Amendment in supporting and
sustaining our constitutional democracy (the “structural” path). While any of
these paths would be an improvement over the Court’s current ad hoc doctrine,
the structural path is both nuanced and systematic and thus holds the most
promise for rationalizing the Court’s approach to these cases.
The questions posed by the Paycheck Problem are not merely academic.
The Court’s shifting rhetoric has very real implications for public law and
private ordering. Approximately 150 million individual tax returns were
filed in the United States in 2017.30 In 2016, roughly 38% of public employees—close to 8 million individuals—were represented by unions, and nearly
35% were full union members.31 Another 7.4 million workers are union
members in the private sector.32 State and local pension plans had more
than 20 million members in 2016, and over 10 million beneficiaries.33 The
rhetoric around the 2016 presidential election suggested that there are many
individuals, like Officer Sam, who would like to opt out of paying their taxes,
union dues, or pension contributions.34 The question is whether the First
Amendment provides them an avenue to do so.

30
31
32
33

34

Brett Collins, Projections of Federal Tax Return Filings: Calendar Years 2011–2018, IRS (2012),
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/12rswinbulreturnfilings.pdf.
BLS 2015 LABOR DATA, supra note 3.
See id.
PHILLIP M. VIDAL, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, ANNUAL SURVEY OF PUBLIC PENSIONS: STATE- AND
LOCALLY-ADMINISTERED DEFINED BENEFIT DATA SUMMARY BRIEF: 2016 (2017),
https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2017/econ/g16-asppsl.pdf. By way of comparison, fewer than 700 individuals “maxed out” in political contributions
the election cycle before the Supreme Court ruled that BCRA’s aggregate contribution limit violated the First Amendment. See McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014); Bob Biersack,
McCutcheon’s Multiplying Effect: Why an Overall Limit Matters, OPENSECRETS.ORG (Sept. 17, 2013),
http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2013/09/mccutcheons-multiplying-effect-why/.
See, e.g., John Cassidy, What Do the Brexit Movement and Donald Trump Have in Common?, NEW YORKER
(June 23, 2016), https://www.newyorker.com/news/john-cassidy/what-do-the-brexit-movement-
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I. THE CHANGING JURISPRUDENCE OF COMPELLED
SUBSIDY CHALLENGES
A. Setting the Scene
A few points help to frame the discussion that follows. First, this is a moment of ascendancy for First Amendment challenges to a wide array of laws.
In most cases the Court continues to recite the traditional First Amendment
“balancing test,” which asks whether a challenged regulation restricts “covered” speech and then, based on the nature of the speech affected, what degree
of scrutiny is warranted.35 Under this approach, restrictions on political speech
are most closely scrutinized—there must be a close fit between a legitimate
government objective and the speech burden, and the restriction must concomitantly be as limited as possible—and other categories less so.36 However,
the test’s continued viability as a workable standard is increasingly in doubt.
In recent years the Court has expanded its First Amendment penumbra and
now reviews restrictions on even commercial speech and viewpoint-neutral
laws with something approaching exacting scrutiny.37 As Professor Fredrick
Schauer recently observed, these developments represent a sea change:

35

36

37

and-donald-trump-have-in-common (comparing the movement for the United Kingdom to withdraw from the EU to the pro-Trump populist movement); Timothy Noah, Does Labor Have a Death
Wish?, POLITICO MAG.: HIST. DEPARTMENT (Nov. 7, 2017), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/11/07/labor-movement-trump-betrayal-215796 (noting that a majority of union
members voted for Trump despite his support for anti-union “right to work” laws).
See, e.g., R. Randall Kelso, The Structure of Modern Free Speech Doctrine: Strict Scrutiny, Intermediate Review,
and “Reasonableness” Balancing, 8 ELON L. REV. 291 (2016) (discussing how the differing types of
speech have traditionally warranted differing degrees of scrutiny). But see United States v. Stevens,
559 U.S. 460, 470 (2010) (“The First Amendment itself reflects a judgment by the American people
that the benefits of its restrictions on the Government outweigh the costs.”).
See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 770–71 (1976)
(recognizing that some restrictions on commercial speech are subject to First Amendment review,
albeit at a lower standard of scrutiny than restrictions on political speech); Cent. Hudson Gas &
Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 637 (1985); United States v. Edge
Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 426 (1993).
See, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 557–59 (2011) (employing “heightened” First
Amendment scrutiny to strike down a state law that prohibited pharmacies from selling doctor’s
prescription records to data mining companies without the doctor’s permission); Reed v. Town of
Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2224, 2228 (2015) (striking down sign ordinances that applied different
size and placement criteria to different signs depending on their content and announcing sweeping
rule that a “law that is content-based on its face is subject to strict scrutiny regardless of the government’s benign motive, content-neutral justification, or lack of ‘animus toward the ideas contained’
in the regulated speech,” potentially jeopardizing many subject-specific regulations (citation omitted)); see also Brown v. Entm’t Merchants Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 789, 799 (2011) (applying strict scrutiny when considering a First Amendment challenge to a law criminalizing the sale or rental of
violent video games to minors); Stevens, 559 U.S. at 468 (sustaining a First Amendment challenge to
a law that criminalized the production of videos depicting animal cruelty).
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In the past, many of the most important issues surrounding the First Amendment were issues about the nature and degree of its protection within its
widely acknowledged coverage. But now the pressure appears to be on coverage itself, with what seems to be an accelerating attempt to widen the scope
of First Amendment coverage to include actions and events traditionally
thought to be far removed from any plausible conception of the purposes of
a principle of free speech.38

The robust approach to the First Amendment’s protections has come at a
cost to government regulation. Indeed, in one recent decision Justice Kennedy
made an enigmatic reference to the Court’s long-repudiated Lochner decision that
appeared to suggest that some Justices view the First Amendment as an appropriate tool to strike down economic regulations, much as Justices in an earlier
era used substantive due process and freedom of contract to do the same.39
It is also helpful to recognize that the argument that the government cannot force someone to subsidize speech with which she disagrees has developed
out of two lines of First Amendment jurisprudence, both of which involved
categories of traditionally-protected speech. First, for more than seventy years
the Court has held that the government cannot compel one to profess particular beliefs.40 It articulated this conclusion in its rulings on two challenges
brought by Jehovah’s Witnesses more than thirty years apart to laws that went
to core political speech—one requiring individuals to recite the Pledge of Allegiance and another requiring the display of the state motto on all license
plates.41 In the latter case, the Court wrote that “[a] system which secures the
right to proselytize religious, political, and ideological causes must also guarantee the concomitant right to decline to foster such concepts. The right to
speak and the right to refrain from speaking are complementary components
of the broader concept of ‘individual freedom of mind.’”42
A conceptually different problem presented itself when a law did not restrict or compel speech itself, but rather an activity with expressive content.
The Court recognized that such activity—whether burning a draft card or
contributing to a candidate—could raise First Amendment issues, but found

38

39

40

41
42

Frederick Schauer, The Politics and Incentives of First Amendment Coverage, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1613, 1614–15 (2015) (listing dozens of recent cases in which the First Amendment has been used
to challenge or to defend against a law of general application).
Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 567 (“The Constitution ‘does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics.’
It does enact the First Amendment.” (quoting Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905)
(Holmes, J., dissenting))).
W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (holding a law requiring recitation
of the Pledge of Allegiance violates the First Amendment), overruling Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis,
310 U.S. 586 (1940).
Id. at 627–29; Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 706–07, 713 (1977) (holding a law requiring New
Hampshire state license plates to display the logo “Live Free or Die” violates the First Amendment).
Wooley, 430 U.S. at 714 (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637).
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that the restriction functioned at a level of remove that made the constitutional harm less acute.43 In Buckley v. Valeo, for example, the Court applied a
less strict standard of review to campaign contribution limits than it applied
to restrictions on the amount a campaign could spend on actual speech.44 It
reasoned that contributions added little more than volume to the existing
marketplace of ideas:
A contribution serves as a general expression of support for the candidate and
his views, but does not communicate the underlying basis for the support. . . . A limitation on the amount of money a person may give to a candidate or campaign organization . . . involves little direct restraint on his political
communication, for it permits the symbolic expression of support evidenced
by a contribution but does not in any way infringe the contributor’s freedom
to discuss candidates and issues. . . . [T]he transformation of contributions into
political debate involves speech by someone other than the contributor.45

Finally, it is helpful at the outset to ask what our constitutional concerns
are—if any—when we consider Sam’s plight in the Paycheck Problem. This
in turn requires us to consider the purpose of the First Amendment and the
nature of its protections. Justice Brandeis long ago wrote that the First
Amendment’s role is to safeguard the “functions essential to effective democracy,” and nearly a century of scholarship has been dedicated to unpacking
what that might mean and how it should look in application.46 Courts and
scholars have suggested at least three possible approaches, all of which appear at various points in Supreme Court opinions yet are not entirely complementary. The first is that we are concerned with how the compelled funding of speech affects the oft-cited “marketplace of ideas,” the sausage factory
43

44

45
46

See, e.g., United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (upholding a law banning the destruction of draft cards and explaining that “a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within
the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental
interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the
incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest”).
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 16 (1976) (“The expenditure of money simply cannot be equated
with such conduct as destruction of a draft card. Some forms of communication made possible by
the giving and spending of money involve speech alone, some involve conduct primarily, and some
involve a combination of the two. Yet this Court has never suggested that the dependence of a
communication on the expenditure of money operates itself to introduce a nonspeech element or
to reduce the exacting scrutiny required by the First Amendment.”).
Id. at 21.
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). See generally ALEXANDER
MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948); ROBERT C.
POST, CITIZENS DIVIDED: CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM AND THE CONSTITUTION (2014); CASS
R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH (1993); C. Edwin Baker, The
Process of Change and the Liberty Theory of the First Amendment, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 293 (1981); Robert H.
Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971); Owen M. Fiss, Free
Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405 (1986); Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech,
130 U. PA. L. REV. 591 (1982); Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment’s Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767
(2001); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Two Concepts of Freedom of Speech, 124 HARV. L. REV. 143 (2010).
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of democracy in which philosophies are debated, elections are decided, and
policy judgments are made.47 The focus here is on preserving content, both
the speaker’s ability to utter it and the listener’s ability to hear it, on the assumption that the best ideas will compete for a Darwinian victory in the public (and public policy) arena.48 A second approach suggests that we should
be concerned whenever the state’s power is brought to bear to infringe an
individual’s autonomy, or one’s freedom to believe or say what one wishes.49
The focus here is on ensuring that government does not force a person to
betray or offend her conscience or sense of self, on the assumption that the
“constitutional guarantee of free speech ultimately serves only one true
value . . . ‘individual self-realization.’”50 A third approach argues that statutes and regulations should be evaluated according to the First Amendment’s
purpose, which is to advance what Robert Post recently described as “democratic legitimation” and “public discourse.”51 The focus here is on process,
both in supporting democratic institutions and encouraging broad and

47

48

49

50

51

See, e.g., Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 229–30 (2000) (holding that a university may
charge students a fee to provide “viewpoint neutral” funding to student groups because the “sole
purpose of [the program is to] facilitat[e] the free and open exchange of ideas by, and among, its
students.” ); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964) (protecting speech in the form
of paid advertisements because any other conclusion “might shut off an important outlet for the
promulgation of information and ideas”); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919)
(Holmes, J., dissenting) (arguing that “the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in
ideas”); Eugene Volokh, In Defense of the Marketplace of Ideas/Search for Truth as a Theory of Free Speech
Protection, 97 VA. L. REV. 595 (2011).
See Volokh, supra note 47, at 596 (arguing that the “marketplace of ideas” is self-regulating because
thinking people “are constantly engaging in a process through which truth and falsehood are separated”). Scholars have long disputed the aptness of this metaphor, and recent findings in the fields
of behavioral economics and social psychology have raised questions about its empirical underpinnings. See generally Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1 (1984);
Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Nobody’s Fools: The Rational Audience as First Amendment Ideal, 2010 U. ILL. L.
REV. 799 (2010); Frederick Schauer, Facts and the First Amendment, 57 UCLA L. REV. 897 (2010).
See, e.g., Redish, supra note 46, at 593 (arguing that the First Amendment protects an individual’s
right to make life-affecting decisions); see also Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 575–
76 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting) (agreeing with the majority that a subsidy for government speech
deprives taxpayers of their “presumptive autonomy as speakers”); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S.
705, 715 (1977) (holding unconstitutional a law requiring citizens to display the state motto on their
license plates); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 634 (1943) (overturning a law
requiring recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance because it violated the First Amendment).
Redish, supra note 46, at 593; cf. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014)
(holding unconstitutional a federal law requiring for-profit corporations, notwithstanding their
owners’ religious beliefs, to provide contraceptive health care to employees ); Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 573 (1995) (“[T]he fundamental
rule of protection under the First Amendment [is] that a speaker has the autonomy to choose the
content of his own message.”).
See POST, supra note 46, at 73; see also SUNSTEIN, supra note 46, at 34–51 (arguing that government
regulation of the “marketplace of ideas” is necessary to ensure opportunity of free expression to all);
Fiss, supra note 46, at 1416 (“When the state acts to enhance the quality of public debate, we should
recognize its actions as consistent with the first amendment.”).
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meaningful participation in public debate. This theory contemplates that
social, economic, and cultural forces at work in modern America can create
circumstances in which the quantity and quality of public debate might, in
fact, “be enriched and our capacity for collective self-determination enhanced” by government regulation of speech.52
Our intuitions around these background principles may steer us in one direction when a regulation threatens to restrict or ban speech in its entirety—
there, the potential threat to the marketplace of ideas may appear most pressing—and another when a regulation compels speech or, as in the Paycheck
Problem, the subsidy of speech. There, the potential threat to our individual
liberty and our right to be free of undue government influence may be our most
available response. Certainly both of these ideas inform the cases discussed below. The question for the reader is whether these, or other, theories provide
grounds for distinguishing among the payments in the Paycheck Problem.
B. Federal Taxes
1. Early Cases
When it comes to his indignation at subsidizing the federal government’s
speech, Sam is in good company. Refusal to pay taxes as a form a civil disobedience is embedded in the formative fabric of the United States, and conscience objections to taxes were argued to—and rejected by—courts long
before the Supreme Court began to engage seriously with the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause.53 In the latter half of the twentieth century, free
speech arguments joined other causes of action claimed by tax resisters in
defending their non-payments. Taxpayers who objected to various government activities—for example, the Vietnam War,54 the Cold War,55 or federal
welfare programs56—sought to withhold all or a percentage of their taxes,
resulting in a “flood of ‘tax protest’ actions which threaten[ed] to drown the
federal court system.”57
52
53

54
55
56
57

Fiss, supra note 46, at 1415.
See Barnes v. First Par. in Falmouth, 6 Mass. (1 Tyng) 401, 407 (Mass. 1810) (upholding tax to
support Protestant clergymen over objection that it interfered with “liberty of conscience”); cf.
Henry David Thoreau, Resistance to Civil Government, in THE WRITINGS OF HENRY D. THOREAU:
REFORM PAPERS 63, 78–84 (Wendell Glick ed., 1973). See generally WE WON’T PAY!: A TAX
RESISTANCE READER (David M. Gross ed., 2008); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, For God and Country:
Taxing Conscience, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 939, 946–82.
United States v. Malinowski, 472 F.2d 850, 852 (3d Cir. 1973).
Welch v. United States, 750 F.2d 1101, 1103 (1st Cir. 1985).
Crowe v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 396 F.2d 766, 767 (8th Cir. 1968) (per curiam).
Fink v. United States, No. 84-109-D, 1984 WL 3062, at *1 (D.N.H. July 10, 1984). For example,
the various taxpayers in Welch withheld as a “war tax credit” 52%, representing the percentage of
the U.S. budget spent on the military, 61% for “government war crimes,” and 50% in protest of
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It was as a free exercise claim that tax protests reached the Supreme
Court in United States v. Lee.58 Mr. Lee was an Amish employer who objected
on religious grounds to making payments into the Social Security system on
behalf of his employees.59 The Court accepted that payment of the tax violated Mr. Lee’s religious beliefs.60 (In fact, self-employed members of certain
religious faiths, including the Amish, were and continue to be exempted from
the requirement that they pay Social Security taxes for themselves on the
condition that, among other things, they claim no benefit from the program.61) A unanimous Court found, however, that the government’s legitimate interest in the Social Security program justified the blanket imposition
of the tax on all employers, regardless of their religious belief.
Although concerning only a challenge to Social Security taxes and considering only a free exercise argument, the Supreme Court’s opinion in Lee was
written expansively, observing that there is “broad public interest in maintaining a sound tax system,” and that the system can only be maintained through
“mandatory and continuous participation.”62 This language was subsequently
cited by lower courts in tax challenges brought under the Free Speech
Clause,63 and indeed in his opinion in Lee, Chief Justice Burger acknowledged
the war tax cases occupying the lower courts, writing that the Court’s holding
would equally apply to challenges to general federal income taxes.64
Lee is discussed further below.65 For now, it is worth noting that while
courts have rejected tax protest arguments since the nation’s founding, until
recently they did so through application of “traditional” First Amendment
analysis, weighing the asserted burden against the government interest.66

58
59
60
61
62
63

64

65
66

the nuclear arms race, from their self-assessed taxes in 1982. Welch, 750 F.2d at 1103.
455 U.S. 252 (1982).
Id. at 254–55.
Id. at 257.
Id. at 260–61; see also 26 U.S.C. § 1402(g)(1) (2016).
Lee, 455 U.S. at 258–59, 260.
See, e.g., Kahn v. United States, 753 F.2d 1208, 1217 (3d Cir. 1985); Welch v. United States, 750
F.2d 1101, 1109 (1st Cir. 1985); Drefchinski v. Regan, 589 F. Supp. 1516, 1526 (W.D. La. 1984);
Franklet v. United States, 578 F. Supp. 1552, 1556 (N.D. Cal. 1984), aff’d, 761 F.2d 529 (9th Cir.
1985).
Lee, 455 U.S. at 260 (“If, for example, a religious adherent believes war is a sin, and if a certain
percentage of the federal budget can be identified as devoted to war-related activities, such individuals would have a similarly valid claim to be exempt from paying that percentage of the income
tax. The tax system could not function if denominations were allowed to challenge the tax system
because tax payments were spent in a manner that violates their religious belief.”).
See infra notes 295–306 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Lee, 455 U.S. at 258–59 (weighing government interest in “mandatory and continuous taxation” against the burden on Lee’s religious exercise).
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2. Government Speech
This analysis has changed with the Supreme Court’s expansion of the
government speech doctrine—the notion that the government does not have
to maintain viewpoint neutrality when it speaks for itself—to compelled subsidy challenges.67 Of particular relevance to the Paycheck Problem are a trio
of cases in which the Supreme Court treated similar challenges to similar
collective funding programs quite differently.
The first of the three cases, Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, asked the
Court to judge the constitutionality of a mandatory assessment levied on California growers to fund generic advertising promoting California stone fruits.68
In upholding the scheme, the Court explained that its previous compelled
speech jurisprudence was inapplicable because the assessments were at best
an indirect burden; they did not “require respondents to repeat an objectionable message out of their own mouths, use their own property to convey an
antagonistic ideological message, force them to respond to a hostile message
when they would prefer to remain silent, or require them to be publicly identified or associated with another’s message.”69 As for a compelled subsidy of
speech claim, the Court observed that the farmers’ objection was not rooted
in politics or conscience but merely in a belief that “their money is not being
well spent,” which was not a First Amendment complaint.70 The collective
marketing program did not “warrant special First Amendment scrutiny” under even the less strict standard that applied to commercial speech because it
was predominantly an economic regulation.71 The majority admonished the
lower court, which had reached the opposite conclusion, that it ought not
substitute its policy judgment for that of Congress.72

67

68
69
70

71

72

See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 192–93 (1991) (“The Government can, without violating the
Constitution, selectively fund a program to encourage certain activities it believes to be in the public
interest, without at the same time funding an alternate program which seeks to deal with the problem in another way. In so doing, the Government has not discriminated on the basis of viewpoint;
it has merely chosen to fund one activity to the exclusion of the other.”).
Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, 521 U.S. 457, 460 (1997).
Id. at 471 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Id. at 472–73 (“The mere fact that objectors believe their money is not being well spent ‘does not
mean [that] they have a First Amendment complaint.’ . . . [O]ur cases provide affirmative support
for the proposition that assessments to fund a lawful collective program may sometimes be used to
pay for speech over the objection of some members of the group.” (quoting Ellis v. Ry. Clerks, 466
U.S. 435, 456 (1984))).
Id. at 474 (“Respondents’ criticisms of generic advertising provide no basis for concluding that factually accurate advertising constitutes an abridgment of anybody’s right to speak freely. Similar
criticisms might be directed at other features of the regulatory orders that impose restraints on
competition that arguably disadvantage particular producers for the benefit of the entire market.”).
Id. at 476 (“[D]oubts concerning the policy judgments that underlie many features of this legislation
do not . . . justify reliance on the First Amendment as a basis for reviewing economic regulations.”).

Feb. 2018]

THE PAYCHECK PROBLEM

577

Just four years later in United States v. United Foods, the Court reversed
course in a case that appeared substantially similar: commercial mushroom
growers objected to a mandatory assessment for generic mushroom advertising.73 Taking a different tack than it had in Glickman, a different majority of
the Court explained that “First Amendment concerns apply . . . because of
the requirement that producers subsidize speech with which they disagree”
and held that the compelled subsidies were unconstitutional.74 Although the
majority suggested that it was applying an intermediate level of scrutiny, it
cited opinions critical of lower levels of scrutiny for commercial speech without deciding the issue.75 The mushroom assessment was different from the
tree fruit assessment in Glickman, the majority explained, because “it is only
the overriding associational purpose which allows any compelled subsidy for
speech in the first place,” and here there was no associational purpose beyond the advertising itself.76 The assessment was not ancillary to a larger
scheme of economic regulation; it was the scheme.77
Notwithstanding this narrow distinction, the majority’s language in United
Foods swept broadly. “First Amendment values are at serious risk if the government can compel a particular citizen, or a discrete group of citizens, to
pay special subsidies for speech on the side that it favors,” Justice Kennedy
wrote for the majority.78 Justice Breyer’s dissent offered the first of many
critiques of the scope of this language:
Nearly every human action that the law affects, and virtually all governmental activity, involves speech. . . . Were the Court . . . to apply the strictest level of scrutiny in every area of speech touched by law . . . it would, at a
minimum, create through its First Amendment analysis a serious obstacle to
the operation of well-established, legislatively created, regulatory programs,
thereby seriously hindering the operation of that democratic self-government that the Constitution seeks to create and to protect.79

73
74
75
76
77
78
79

United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 408 (2001).
Id. at 410–11.
Id. at 409–10.
Id. at 413. The dissent argued that this logic created an “unreasoned distinction between heavily
regulated and less heavily regulated speakers.” Id. at 428 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 415–16 (majority opinion) (“[T]he expression respondent is required to support is not germane to a purpose related to an association independent from the speech itself”).
Id. at 411.
Id. at 424–25 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Gregory Klass, The Very Idea of a First Amendment Right
Against Compelled Subsidization, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1087, 1107 (2005) (criticizing the decision’s
“unprincipled character”); Robert Post, Transparent and Efficient Markets: Compelled Commercial Speech
and Coerced Commercial Association in United Foods, Zauderer, and Abood, 40 Val. U.L. Rev. 555, 557
(2006) (criticizing United Foods as having “fundamentally altered received First Amendment doctrine” in ways that are “novel” and “seriously misguided”).
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As the dissent anticipated, in the immediate aftermath of United Foods the
case was cited in a “cascade” of lawsuits challenging economic cooperatives.80 Commentators suggested these would be the tip of the iceberg, noting
that the implications of United Foods “were breathtaking, suggesting that every
time tax dollars were used to support government speech, persons who objected to their use could challenge it on free speech grounds.”81 Against these
new lawsuits the government introduced an argument that it had raised too
late in United Foods: that the compelled subsidies were permissible because
they were funding government speech.
In one of these cases, cattle ranchers objected to funding the Department
of Agriculture’s “Beef: It’s What’s for Dinner” campaign.82 Relying on United
Foods, the Eighth Circuit ruled for the ranchers, finding that the government
speech doctrine (the government’s new argument) only protected the government from charges of viewpoint discrimination, not compelled funding arguments.83 The Supreme Court quickly granted certiorari and reversed, explaining in Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Association that it had presumed in
United Foods that the compelled subsidy there was supporting private speech.84
By contrast, “[c]ompelled support of government—even those programs of
government one does not approve—is of course perfectly constitutional, as
every taxpayer must attest.”85
Much of Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion in Johanns was concerned with
describing how the beef check-off program and advertisements—which were
attributed simply to “America’s Beef Producers”—were government speech.86
This was the contention over which the Court split. In dissent, Justice Souter,
joined by Justices Stevens and Kennedy, did not dispute the premise that the
First Amendment was implicated by the assessment program, nor that one
could be compelled to fund government speech (although he recognized that
80
81
82
83

84
85
86

Post, supra note 29, at 196.
G. Edward White, The Evolution of First Amendment Protection for Compelled Commercial Speech, 29 J.L. &
POL. 481, 496–97 (2014); see also Post, supra note 79, at 557.
Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 554 (2005) (plurality opinion).
Livestock Mktg. Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 335 F.3d 711, 717, 722, 725–26 (8th Cir. 2003),
vacated sub nom. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550 (2005) (plurality opinion); see also
Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991) (“The Government can, without violating the Constitution, selectively fund a program to encourage which seeks to deal with the problem in another way.
In doing so, the Government has not discriminated on the basis of viewpoint; it has merely chosen
to fund one activity to the exclusion of the other. ‘[A] legislature’s decision not to subsidize the
exercise of a fundamental right does not infringe that right.’” (quoting Regan v. Taxation with
Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 549 (1983))).
Johanns, 544 U.S. at 558.
Id. at 559.
Id. at 555, 560–65. Justices Breyer and Ginsburg, while concurring in the judgment because the
program was a form of permissible economic regulation, expressed skepticism that the speech could
be properly deemed “government speech.” See id. at 569 (Breyer, J., concurring); id. at 569–70
(Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment).
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the government speech doctrine was still “new and . . . imprecise”).87 However, he disagreed that the government speech doctrine applied in the present
case. He reasoned that compelled subsidization of government speech is “tolerable” because, in part, of the “adequacy of the democratic process.”88 But
this process could not safeguard the ranchers’ rights when the beef advertisements did not identify the government as speaker.89
What is most notable for purposes of the Paycheck Problem is that unlike
the Glickman decision less than a decade earlier, both the plurality and primary
dissent in Johanns understood the ranchers to state a viable First Amendment
claim; they just disagreed as to whether the speech at issue qualified as government speech.90 The Court also declined to take the opportunity to overrule United Foods, leaving intact its prior holding that even where commercial
speech is at issue, “using special subsidies exacted from a designated class of
persons, some of whom object to the idea being advanced,” to fund private
speech violates the First Amendment.91 As discussed below, both of these observations have implications for Sam’s situation beyond the tax context.
It is rather remarkable—and perhaps a sign of the growing ambitions of
litigants regarding the First Amendment’s deregulatory potential—that it
was not until well into America’s third century that the Supreme Court recognized a categorical exception barring free speech compelled subsidy challenges to taxes. (The Court, it should be noted, has taken a different approach to religious-based challenges to special assessment schemes.92) For
87
88
89
90

91
92

Id. at 574–75 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id at 575.
Id. at 577–78.
Compare id. at 565 n.8 (plurality opinion) (recognizing the argument that “being forced to fund someone else’s private speech unconnected to any legitimate government purpose violates personal autonomy,” but disagreeing as to whether there was a legitimate government interest), with id. at 575–
76 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that “the relative palatability of a remote subsidy shared by every
taxpayer is not to be found when the speech is funded with targeted taxes. For then, as here, the
particular interests of those singled out to pay the tax are closely linked with the expression, and
taxpayers who disagree with it suffer a more acute limitation on their presumptive autonomy as
speakers to decide what to say and what to pay for others to say”).
United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 4010 (2001).
For example, in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores the Court permitted closely-held private companies to
opt out of the Affordable Care Act’s (“ACA”) contraception coverage mandate, finding that the
mandate was not the “least restrictive means” for the government to achieve its purpose. 134 S.
Ct. 2751, 2805 (2014); cf. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 574 (2012) (upholding the individual mandate of the ACA as a permissible exercise of Congress’s taxing power). The
challenge was brought under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”), 42 U.S.C. §
2000bb-1 (2012), not the Constitution, and government speech was not at issue. Hobby Lobby, 134
S. Ct. at 2782. The majority distinguished Lee because “[r]ecognizing a religious accommodation
under RFRA for particular coverage requirements . . . does not threaten the viability of ACA’s
comprehensive scheme in the way that recognizing religious objections to particular expenditures
from general tax revenues would.” Id. at 2783–84. This may misread Lee, which was in fact an
objection to a targeted assessment and expenditure, and in a context in which Congress had already
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Sam’s purposes, Johanns would seem to resolve at least one of the questions
presented in the Paycheck Problem, albeit in a manner that does not resolve
the larger question because it provides limited guidance on the contours of
the government speech doctrine or its justifications.
C. Union Agency Fees
1. Early Cases
Our analysis of Sam’s challenge to his union agency fee begins with Abood
v. Detroit Board of Education.93 Abood was the last in a trio of cases between 1956
and 1977 that set the contours for federal and state labor laws.94 Under
them, once a group of employees votes to unionize, a single union is empowered to serve as their exclusive representative, and the employer is bound to
negotiate with the union in good faith.95 In exchange, unions are required
to represent all covered employees—members and nonmembers—equally in
collective bargaining and related contract administration, they are limited in
their ability to picket, and they must comply with detailed reporting and accounting requirements.96 Unions cannot require a worker to become a full
card-carrying member or support all union activities.97 They can, however,
charge all employees they represent an “agency” or “fair share” fee of “peri-

93
94

95

96
97

provided an opt-out option for individuals with similar objections to Mr. Lee, but that is an issue
for another day. See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261–63 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(arguing that granting an exemption for Amish people would not threaten the Social Security tax
scheme as the majority suggested, but nonetheless agreeing “that there is virtually no room for a
‘constitutionally required exemption’ on religious grounds from a valid tax law that is entirely neutral in its general application” (quoting id. at 256 (majority opinion))). Of more interest to the present inquiry was the Court’s explanation that “protecting the free-exercise rights of corporations . . . protects the religious liberty of the humans who own and control those companies,” Hobby
Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768, thus suggesting that in some circumstances the Court views the constitutional rights of corporations as emanating from the rights of its individual shareholders.
431 U.S. 209 (1977).
See id.; see also National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2012); Railway
Labor Act (“RLA”), 45 U.S.C. §§ 151–188 (2012); Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740
(1961); Ry. Emps. Dep’t v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956).
See Abood, 431 U.S. at 220–21 (describing the benefits and burdens that federal law assigns to a
designated union); see also 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a), 159 (2012) (requiring employer to bargain with employee representatives and providing that “[r]epresentatives designated or selected for the purposes
of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit . . . shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining . . . .”); Cynthia
Estlund, Are Unions a Constitutional Anomaly?, 114 MICH. L. REV. 169, 196–99 (2015) (noting that an
employer’s duty to bargain exclusively with certain employee representatives in good faith “is an
extraordinary departure from the background principle of freedom of contract”).
See Estlund, supra note 95, at 199–204.
Id. at 181–83.
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odic dues, initiation fees, and assessments” to cover the costs of union services.98 While the federal laws prevent states from banning unions, they have
been interpreted to permit states to bar the imposition of these fair share or
agency fees, and to date twenty-eight states have passed such statutes.99
In the first of the cases leading to Abood, Railway Employees’ Department v.
Hanson, the Supreme Court upheld a law permitting mandatory agency fees
against several constitutional challenges, including a First Amendment argument brought by dissenting employees who had voted against unionization
and did not want to pay the agency fee.100 The Court recognized that the
mandatory assessment provision of the Railway Labor Act (“RLA”) was controversial, but it reasoned that so long as its imposition was “relevant or appropriate to the constitutional power which Congress exercises,” the wisdom
of the decision “is one of policy with which the judiciary has no concern.”101
Congress was allowed to impose the agency fee because “[i]ndustrial peace
along the arteries of commerce is a legitimate objective.”102
The Hanson Court specifically reserved judgment on situations in which
the dues, fees, or assessments were wielded as fines or penalties, or situations
in which they served as “cover for forcing ideological conformity or other
action in contravention of the First Amendment.”103 The latter question
came back to the Court five years later in International Association of Machinists
v. Street,104 a case in which the employees built a substantial record that a
portion of their union payments were being used to support political causes
and candidates with which they disagreed.105 In evaluating whether the challenged “union shop” provision of the RLA could be construed in a manner
consistent with the Constitution, the Court looked at the legislative history
discussing the authorization of the mandatory fees. Union representatives
98

99

100
101
102
103

104
105

45 U.S.C. § 152 (2012); see also Hanson, 351 U.S. at 238 (“[N]o conditions to membership may be
imposed except as respects ‘periodic dues, initiation fees, and assessments.’” (quoting 45 U.S.C.
§ 152 (2012))); 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (2012) (prohibiting unions from causing discriminatory treatment of an employee whose membership has been denied “on some ground other than his failure
to tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or
retaining membership”).
See Estlund, supra note 95, at 181 n.57; Right to Work States, NAT’L RIGHT TO WORK LEGAL DEF.
FOUND., http://www.nrtw.org/rtws.htm (last visited Nov. 22, 2017); see also Sweeney v. Pence, 767
F.3d 654, 657, 671 (7th Cir. 2014) (upholding as constitutional Indiana’s Right to Work law, which
prevented individuals from being required to pay fair share fees); id. at 683 (Wood, J., dissenting)
(offering an alternative reading of the relevant statutory provisions).
Hanson, 351 U.S. at 238.
Id. at 234.
Id. at 233.
Id. at 238 (“On the present record, there is no more an infringement or impairment of First Amendment rights than there would be in the case of a lawyer who by state law is required to be a member
of an integrated bar.”).
367 U.S. 740 (1961).
Id. at 747–48.
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had argued to Congress that because the law tasked the union with considerable—and costly—responsibilities, including collective bargaining and
handling employee grievances, the law would create a “free rider” problem
if it lacked a mechanism to require everyone to pay their fair share of these
expenses.106 The Court upheld the imposition of agency fees for these reasons; however, it found no evidence that Congress intended that the mandatory fees permit unions to force employees, “over their objection, to support
political causes which they oppose.”107 The union was free to make political
expenditures, but not with the money of objecting union-shop employees,
who needed only pay a lower agency fee for covered services.108
In so construing the statute, the Street Court avoided the constitutional
question. It also avoided passing judgment on expenses that fell into the grey
area “between the costs which led directly to the complaint as to ‘free riders,’
and the expenditures to support union political activities.”109 Both of these
issues were presented in Abood. Detroit public school teachers in a recently
unionized workplace sought to overturn a state law that mirrored federal labor laws in substantial respects, including the grant of exclusive representation to unions and their duty of fair representation for all covered employees.110 The Michigan law, however, explicitly allowed the union to spend its
agency fees on “legislative lobbying and in support of political candidates.”111
Both the mandatory fee and its use for political purposes were challenged.112
The Abood Court answered the two questions quite differently. As to the
mandatory agency fee, the Court agreed that petitioners raised a valid First
Amendment objection, but found that the resolution of the question was answered by Hanson, which sustained agency fees against a First Amendment
challenge, and Street, which read the RLA to bar the use of nonmember fees
for unrelated ideological or political purposes.113 While the Court acknowledged that differences between public- and private-sector workplaces existed

106
107

108
109
110
111
112
113

Id. at 761.
Id. at 764; see also id. at 767–68 (“Congress . . . was made fully aware that it was deciding these
critical issues of individual right versus collective interests . . . . Indeed, Congress gave very concrete
evidence that it carefully considered the claims of the individual to be free of arbitrary or unreasonable restrictions resulting from compulsory unionism. It did not give a blanket approval to unionshop agreements. Instead it enacted a precise and carefully drawn limitation on the kind of unionshop agreements which might be made. The obvious purpose of this careful prescription was to
strike a balance between the interests pressed by the unions and the considerations which the Carriers have urged.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
Id. at 770.
Id. at 769–70.
Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 223–24 (1977).
Id. at 215.
Id. at 212–13.
Id. at 226–32.
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and might bear on policy judgments regarding the decision to authorize public-sector unions, it rejected the contention that the public/private sector distinction meaningfully altered the constitutional burden the agency fee imposed
on an individual employee.114 The Michigan law did not limit any employee’s
ability to express her views about issues subject to the collective bargaining
agreement, the Court noted, and employees in the private sector might also
object to “a variety of union activities [that] conflict with their beliefs.”115 Petitioners’ emphasis on public-sector employment as being inherently political
was misplaced in this context, the Court explained. First, “[n]othing in the
First Amendment or our cases discussing its meaning makes the question
whether the adjective ‘political’ can properly be attached to those beliefs the
critical constitutional inquiry.”116 Second, the Court’s previous cases had already assumed that the agency fees imposed a significant First Amendment
burden. The fee could be assessed not because it did not impact speech rights,
but because even in light of that impact it was a reasonable legislative solution
to a significant issue that was within Congress’s power to regulate.117
As to the question of how the union could spend the money collected via
mandatory fees, the Court overturned the state law insofar as it permitted
agency fees to be used for “political and ideological purposes unrelated to
collective bargaining.”118 In doing so, it employed soaring and oft-quoted
rhetoric to declare that
at the heart of the First Amendment is the notion that an individual should
be free to believe as he will, and that in a free society one’s beliefs should be
shaped by his mind and his conscience rather than coerced by the State.
And the freedom of belief is no incidental or secondary aspect of the First
Amendment’s protections.119

114
115

116
117
118
119

Id. at 232 (“The differences between public- and private-sector collective bargaining simply do not
translate into differences in First Amendment rights.”).
Id. at 230 (“The very real differences between exclusive-agent collective bargaining in the public
and private sectors are not such as to work any greater infringement upon the First Amendment
interests of public employees.”); id. at 231–32 (“[O]ur cases have never suggested that expression
about philosophical, social, artistic, economic, literary, or ethical matters—to take a nonexhaustive
list of labels—is not entitled to full First Amendment protection. Union members in both the public
and private sectors may find that a variety of union activities conflict with their beliefs.”). Just a
year before, the Court had held that even commercial speech was due some level of constitutional
protection. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762
(1976).
Abood, 431 U.S. at 232.
Id. at 219.
Id. at 232.
Id. at 234–35 (citations omitted). The Court quoted from both West Virginia Board of Education v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642, a compelled speech decision, and Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 22–23, a
money-for-speech decision, in this section of its opinion, ignoring any distinction between a direct
and indirect imposition of a speech compulsion. Abood, 431 U.S. at 234–35.
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The best way to reconcile these apparently discordant descriptions of an
employee’s First Amendment rights is to recognize the work done by the dependent clause “unrelated to collective bargaining”—which the Court repeats
several times throughout its opinion120—to focus the First Amendment inquiry
on whether the union has unduly leveraged its position as exclusive representative to extract funds that exceed its statutory purpose.121 Whereas the Abood
litigants had argued that the touchstone of their case rested in the notion of
whether the speech at issue was “political,” the Court’s ruling instead turned
on whether it was “related” to the overriding statutory scheme. So long as the
funds at issue are being spent on activities intended to benefit employees and
that the union is required to furnish, an employee can be asked to provide
them; funds used to benefit the union’s political goals must be voluntary.122
Until recently, this “related/unrelated” distinction guided the Court’s
analysis of compelled subsidy claims raised in similar contexts, with compelled fees for provided services held constitutional even if potentially controversial speech were involved, and compelled fees for ideological activity
not part of the organization’s core mission barred by the First Amendment.123 For example, in Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Association, the Court held
that a union could not use agency fees to fund litigation by a national affiliate
that did not concern its unit, but it could charge nonmembers for strike preparation in support of its collective bargaining goals.124 Similarly, in Keller v.
State Bar, the Court applied Abood to hold that state bar associations could

120
121

122
123

124

See id. at 215, 232, 236, 241.
See Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 786 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting) (noting that
the “imposition of ‘assessments . . . not germane to collective bargaining’ would present ‘a different
problem’” (quoting Ry. Emps. Dep’t v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 235 (1956))).
Abood, 431 U.S. at 235–36.
Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass’n, 500 U.S. 507, 519 (1991); see also Ellis v. Bhd. of Ry., Airline & S.S.
Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 448 (1984) (“[W]hen employees . . . object to being burdened with particular
union expenditures, the test must be whether the challenged expenditures are necessarily or reasonably incurred for the purpose of performing the duties of an exclusive representative of the employees in dealing with the employer on labor-management issues.”); cf. Agency for Int’l Dev. v.
All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2321, 2326–27 (2013) (holding that a federal program
that “compels as a condition of federal funding the affirmation of a belief that by its nature cannot
be confined within the scope of the Government program” violates the First Amendment); Keller
v. State Bar, 496 U.S. 1, 14 (1990) (noting that a group “may not . . . fund activities of an ideological
nature” that are “not ‘germane’ to the purpose for which compelled association was justified”).
Employees with a religious objection to an agency fee are typically allowed by statute to contribute
the funds they would have paid to a union to a charity of their choice. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 169
(2012); ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.225 (2016); WASH. REV. CODE § 47.64.160 (2017).
Lehnert, 500 U.S. at 528. If the union had actually engaged in a strike, that would have been illegal
and not chargeable. Id. at 531.
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only extract compulsory fees from attorneys for purposes related to the regulation and improvement of the profession and not for unrelated ideological
initiatives, such as lobbying for gun regulations.125
Given that the union activity to which Sam objects—negotiating for the
increased use of BWCs—arises within the context of the union’s collective
bargaining duties, it would seem that he has no viable First Amendment claim
to opt out of payments. Or so it would have seemed up until 2012, when the
Supreme Court began openly questioning the balance struck in Abood.
2. Knox and Harris
Notwithstanding Hanson and its progeny, Sam’s objection to paying his
union agency fee comes at a time when the Court appears ready to reconsider the lines it drew in its earlier union cases. A shift in the winds—or a
shaking in the foundation—was signaled in 2012 with Knox v. Service Employees
Union International, Local 1000.126 The case appeared to present a relatively
discrete procedural issue—the administration of a mid-year assessment by a
union for political lobbying—but in his majority opinion against the union,
Justice Alito spent several paragraphs criticizing Abood in dicta, calling the
Court’s previous “[a]cceptance of the free-rider argument as a justification
for compelling nonmembers to pay a portion of union dues . . . something of
an anomaly—one that we have found to be justified by the interest in furthering ‘labor peace.’”127 Crucially, the majority opinion also blurred the
distinction the Court had long observed between speech and financial support for speech, holding that “the compulsory fees constitute a form of compelled speech,” not mere subsidy of speech.128
Litigants saw, if not an invitation, certainly an opportunity in Knox’s language, and within two years a union agency fee case directly challenging Abood
was before the Court. The petitioners in Harris v. Quinn were home health
aide workers in Illinois who had recently been unionized and objected to the
imposition of agency fees.129 The majority of the Court, in an opinion again
written by Justice Alito, upheld their challenge but sidestepped the big question, finding that because the employees in question were only “quasi” rather
than “full” government employees—for example, they were paid by the state
but hired by individual patients—Abood and its progeny did not apply; the

125

126
127
128
129

Keller, 496 U.S. at 12 (finding “a substantial analogy between the relationship of the State Bar and
its members, on the one hand, and the relationship of employee unions and their members, on the
other”).
567 U.S. 298, 309–11 (2012).
Id. at 311 (quoting Chi. Teachers Union, Local No. 1 v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 303 (1986)).
Id. at 310; see also supra notes 44–45 and accompanying text.
Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2626 (2014).
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focus thus was on the nature of the speech restriction itself rather than whether
the fee supported activities “germane” to collective bargaining.130 Free of the
force of precedent, the case proceeded under “generally applicable First
Amendment standards.”131 The Court subjected the fee to “exacting scrutiny,”132 asking whether the mandatory agency fee served “a ‘compelling state
interes[t] . . . that cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms.’”133 In using this test to strike down the agency
fee, the majority rejected the underlying rationales for Abood, which it seemed
to leave standing only out of deference to precedent.
It is telling to look at how the majority in Harris (and, to a large extent,
Knox) analyzed the First Amendment issues presented. Both Harris and Knox
held that the compelled subsidy of speech “presents the same dangers as compelled speech”; there was no difference between being forced to say something and forced to pay for someone else to say something, even if one’s own
ability to speak up is unfettered.134 Thus it followed that because the agency
fees required an employee to support speech on a matter of public concern,
they placed a severe First Amendment burden on the dissenting workers.135
If the majority took a broad view of the First Amendment burden, it took
a narrow view of the government’s countervailing interests. In a cramped
reading of history, Justice Alito framed the government’s interest in “labor
peace” as simply a desire to avoid disputes between unions vying to represent
employees.136 Because the union in Harris retained its exclusive bargaining

130

131
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133
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135
136

Id. at 2638. The dissent and commentators have critiqued the majority opinion as seizing on a
distinction without a difference—or, if it was a meaningful difference, without adequately describing what unique aspects of the Illinois home health aide scheme merited departure from Abood. Id.
at 2645 (Kagan, J., dissenting). Justice Alito did take the opportunity to criticize Hanson and Abood
in dicta as, variously, “thin,” “unsupported,” and “questionable.” Id. at 2621, 2629, 2632 (majority
opinion). Street was dismissed because “[it] was not a constitutional decision.” Id. at 2621.
Id. at 2639.
Id. at 2639 (“[A]n agency-fee provision imposes ‘a significant impingement on First Amendment
rights,’ and this cannot be tolerated unless it passes ‘exacting First Amendment scrutiny.’” (quoting
Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1000, 567 U.S. 298, 310 (2012))).
Id. at 2639 (quoting Knox, 567 U.S. at 310).
Id.; Knox, 567 U.S. at 309–11, 313–14. Justice Alito doubled down on this reading in the recent
Janus v. AFSCME oral argument, comparing union nonmembers to Thomas Moore in A Man for All
Seasons, and asking: “When you compel somebody to speak, don’t you infringe that person’s dignity
and conscience in a way that you do not when you restrict what the person says?” Transcript of
Oral Argument at 38–45, Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps. (“AFSCME”), Council
31, No. 16-1466 (U.S. Feb. 26, 2018); A MAN FOR ALL SEASONS (Highland Films 1966); see also
Transcript of Oral Argument at 4–7, Janus supra (reflecting that Petitioner’s counsel framed an
agency fee as compelled speech, not compelled subsidization).
Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2642.
Id. at 2631; see Gen. Cable Corp., 139 N.L.R.B. 1123, 1125 (1962); see also Int’l Ass’n of Machinists
v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 750–63 (1961) (giving a history of labor negotiations). Attempting to swing
an existing union is in fact already barred by NLRB rules.
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status, he explained that this interest was irrelevant.137 As for the government’s interest in everyone paying their “fair share,” Justice Alito only mentioned this concern in passing, relying on his statement in Knox to dismiss
“free-rider arguments . . . [as] generally insufficient to overcome First
Amendment objections” without further discussion.138 To reconstruct, then,
the Court’s argument between Knox and Harris: the free-rider argument is
only relevant as it pertains to furthering labor peace; labor peace is only
about inter-union rivalries; thanks to exclusive representation provisions,
there is no risk of inter-union rivalries; thus, there is no need to be concerned
for labor peace; ergo: free-rider arguments are no longer compelling.139
This, of course, reads out any possibility that preventing free-riding might
promote labor peace—the proposition from which Knox had started—in
ways unrelated to inter-union rivalries (for example, reducing workplace tensions between members and nonmembers), or that it might serve other important purposes, such as avoiding the constitutionally problematic scenario
of requiring unions to provide services to those who refuse to pay for them.140
The Harris majority also significantly restated the test to determine if the
government’s interests could be met by “means significantly less restrictive”
than the mandatory agency fee. The union argued that all home health care
workers had received significant benefits due to union representation and thus,
it was implied, should equally bear the costs of representation.141 Justice Alito
explained that this showing was insufficient.142 The fair share mandate could
only be sustained if “the cited benefits for personal assistants could not have
been achieved if the union had been required to depend for funding on the
dues paid by those personal assistants who chose to join.”143 It was not enough
to show that the loss of the funds would hurt the union; the loss must be fatal
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Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2640; see also 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(C) (2012) (establishing that it would be an
unfair labor practice for a union to “forc[e] or requir[e] any employer to recognize or bargain with
a particular labor organization as the representative of his employees if another labor organization
has been certified as the representative of such employees . . . .”).
Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2627 (quoting Knox, 567 U.S. at 311). As for the fact that the union’s privileges
as an exclusive agent came with the responsibility to represent all employees equally, whether or
not they were union members, the majority reasoned that this burden was of little import because
Illinois law already constrained many of the terms on which the union could bargain. Id. at 2640.
See Knox, 567 U.S. at 311 (“[T]he free-rider argument [is] . . . one that we have found to be justified
by the interest in furthering ‘labor peace.’” (quoting Chi. Teachers Union, Local No. 1 v. Hudson,
475 U.S. 292, 303 (1986))); Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2631.
See infra note 303.
Harris, 134. S. Ct. at 2640–41.
Id.
Id. at 2641; see also Transcript of Oral Argument at 72, Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n, 136 S.
Ct. 1083 (2016) (per curiam) (No. 14-915) (“Abood never said, and no case since Abood has ever said,
that agency fees are necessary to union survival. Abood couldn’t have said that, because when Abood
ruled as it did, TaftHartley had been on the books for decades.”).
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to it. The majority, which introduced this reformulated test with no citation,
seemed to put the burden for proving this counterfactual on the union.144
Four Justices dissented in an opinion authored by Justice Kagan.145
Among other points, she revisited the question of whether the government
had shown a compelling interest justifying the fee. Justice Kagan argued that
the majority had fundamentally misunderstood (or ignored) the argument
advanced by the state and union. The “free rider” justification was not (only)
about the fairness of nonunion members receiving some ancillary “spillover”
benefit from the union’s activities, but about the fact that the union was legally bound to represent the nonmembers and could not discriminate against
them in its negotiations.146 Justice Kagan quoted at length from an earlier
opinion by Justice Scalia upholding agency fees:
The “compelling state interest” that justifies this constitutional rule is not
simply elimination of the inequity arising from the fact that some union activity redounds to the benefit of “free-riding” nonmembers; private speech
often furthers the interests of nonspeakers, and that does not alone empower
the state to compel the speech to be paid for. What is distinctive, however,
about the “free riders” [in unions] . . . is that . . . the law requires the union to
carry [free riders]—indeed, requires the union to go out of its way to benefit
[them], even at the expense of its other interests. . . . [T]he free ridership (if
it were left to be that) would be not incidental but calculated, not imposed
by circumstances but mandated by government decree.147

The Harris majority, which included Justice Scalia, did not address this
argument.148
Justice Scalia’s forceful earlier opinion justifying agency fees and his failure
to write separately in Knox and Harris did not go unremarked by commentators. “The silence of the normally voluble Justice Scalia is both aberrant and
enigmatic,” William Gould observed in a review of the 2014 Supreme Court
term.149 He noted that a majority of the Court appeared poised to overrule
Abood squarely if presented with the right case, and he flagged a recent Ninth
Circuit decision that might provide just such a vehicle, Friedrichs v. California
144
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See Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2641 (“[A] majority of the personal assistants voted to unionize. When they
did so, they must have realized that this would require the payment of union dues, and therefore it
may be presumed that a high percentage of these personal assistants became union members and
are willingly paying union dues. Why are these dues insufficient . . . ?”).
Id. at 2644 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2656.
Id. at 2657 (quoting Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass’n, 500 U.S. 507, 556 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part)).
While not in direct response to the dissent, the majority opinion did note that the health care union’s
“scope of bargaining” was “sharply limited” by statute, presumably implying that the services provided were not significant, but this goes only to the amount charged, not the underlying principle.
Id. at 2635 (majority opinion).
William B. Gould IV, Organized Labor, the Supreme Court, and Harris v. Quinn: Déjà Vu All Over Again?,
2014 SUP. CT. REV. 133, 157 (2014).
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Teachers Association.150 “The good news is that Justice Scalia . . . could still tip
the delicate balance,” Professor Gould wrote. Then again, he added wryly,
“The bad news is that Justice Scalia could tip the balance.”151
3. Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association
We know now that Justice Scalia would have tipped the balance, although
we may never know for sure which way.152 Rebecca Friedrichs was a veteran
California public school teacher who objected to many of the policy positions
advocated by her union and challenged the mandatory agency fee in court.153
Her eponymous lawsuit was rushed through the lower courts by groups long
opposed to unions, but it arrived at the Supreme Court just a bit too late.154
The case was argued on January 11, 2016.155 Barely a month later, on February 13, Justice Scalia passed away suddenly, and Friedrichs became the first significant case to be summarily affirmed by a 4-4 vote in the 2015–2016 term.156
For observers, Friedrichs presented a rare opportunity of extended equipoise,
the legal equivalent of an insect frozen in amber. More than fifty briefs were
filed either in support of or in opposition to the questions presented, which
asked the Court, first, whether Abood should be overruled, and second, whether
the First Amendment requires that union membership be determined via optin rather than opt-out clauses.157 The Paycheck Problem is concerned with the
first question, which consumed the bulk of the briefing and oral argument.
150

151
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154
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Id. at 160 (citing Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n, No. 13–57095, 2014 WL 10076847 (9th Cir.
Nov. 18, 2014), aff’g No. SACV 13–676–JLS (CWx), 2013 WL 9825479 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2013),
aff’d by an equally divided court, 136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016) (per curiam)).
Id. at 173.
But see Adam Liptak, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, No Fan of Donald Trump, Critiques Latest Term, N.Y. TIMES
(July 10, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/11/us/politics/ruth-bader-ginsburg-no-fanof-donald-trump-critiques-latest-term.html (quoting Justice Ginsburg that “[t]his court couldn’t
have done better than it did” with the 4-4 result in Friedrichs).
Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n, No. SACV 13–676–JLS (CWx), 2013 WL 9825479 (C.D. Cal.
Dec. 5, 2013), aff’d, No. 13–57095, 2014 WL 10076847 (9th Cir. Nov. 18, 2014), aff’d by an equally
divided court, 136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016) (per curiam).
The petitioners did not even pause to develop a record. Transcript of Oral Argument at 61–62,
Friedrichs, 136 S. Ct. 1083 (No. 14-915).
Id.
Friedrichs, 136 S. Ct. 1083; see Lyle Denniston, Opinion Analysis: Result but No Guidance on Public Unions’
Fees, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 29, 2016, 11:44 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/03/opinionanalysis-result-but-no-guidance-on-public-unions-fees/ (“Tuesday’s result in this key case marked
the second time that the Court, with its membership reduced by one, had divided evenly in a case it
had reviewed. A week ago, it did so in a case about spouses’ responsibility for each others’ debts.”
(citing Hawkins v. Cmty. Bank of Raymore, 136 S. Ct. 1072 (2016) (per curiam))). Petitioners’ request for a new hearing before nine Justices was denied. Friedrichs v. Cal. Teacher’s Ass’n, 136 S.
Ct. 2545 (2016) (mem.).
Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association, SCOTUSBLOG , http://www.scotusblog.com/casefiles/cases/friedrichs-v-california-teachers-association/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2018) (indicating that
58 amicus briefs were filed).
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Petitioners did not attempt to distinguish Abood but challenged it as
wrongly decided.158 Thus their argument was framed by an effort to distinguish Hanson and Street, which involved private-sector unions, from situations
involving public-sector unions.159 Advancing again the argument the Court
had rejected nearly forty years earlier, Petitioners contended that virtually all
terms of public employment were “political” and thus the agency fee should
be subject to exacting First Amendment scrutiny.160 To the extent they made
this argument in an effort to distinguish the private sector cases from Abood,
they may have proved too little; Abood itself subjected the public teachers’
agency fee to “exacting scrutiny.”161 To the extent they made this argument
to suggest that the previous union cases had underestimated the First Amendment burden the agency fee places on public employees, they may have
proved too much. “[C]ompelled subsidization of speech and mandated association receive exacting First Amendment scrutiny even in the ‘mundane’
contexts of commercial speech and general civic groups,” Petitioners argued
in their opening brief.162 Given this, one might wonder—as several of the
Justices did at oral argument—why Petitioners’ argument did not also sweep
into its ambit private union agreements such as those in Hanson and Street.163
While Petitioners did acknowledge that their lawsuit presented a compelled
subsidy rather than a compelled speech challenge, it is not clear that they
viewed the First Amendment burden in any way attenuated by the fact.164 California Teachers Association’s (“CTA”) collective bargaining activities raised
special First Amendment concerns, Petitioners explained, because they included speech that was potentially “politically controversial or inconsistent
with the beliefs of some teachers,”165 they involved issues of “public concern”

158
159
160

161
162
163

164
165

Brief for the Petitioners at 16, Friedrichs, 136 S. Ct. 1083 (No. 14-915), 2015 WL 5261564 [hereinafter Friedrichs Pet’r Br.].
Id. at 29, 2015 WL 5261564.
Id. at 20, 2015 WL 5261564; see Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 232 (1977) (“Nothing
in the First Amendment or our cases discussing its meaning makes the question whether the adjective ‘political’ can properly be attached to those beliefs the critical constitutional inquiry.”).
Id. at 259 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment).
Friedrichs Pet’r Br., supra note 158, at 18.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 6, Friedrichs, 136 S. Ct. 1083 (No. 14-915). Petitioner Counsel’s
explanation that private union agreements are distinguishable because “the First Amendment
doesn’t apply to private employers, and because in [prior private union cases] the Court established
the rules for agency shops based on the statute without any First Amendment [analysis]” was met
by some skepticism by certain members of the Court. Id. at 6–15; see also supra notes 73–79 (discussing United Foods).
See, e.g., Friedrichs Pet’r Br., supra note 158, at 10–11.
Id. at 22.
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and attempts to “influence governmental policymaking,”166 and they had a fiscal impact of the state budget.167 Consider these objections in light of the full
range of activities that prompt Sam’s concerns in the Paycheck Problem.
A review of the oral argument transcript suggests that the case may have
come down to the “narrowly tailored” question, as re-shaped in Harris: could
the union survive without the mandatory agency fee? Justice Scalia focused
on this question during oral argument, and parties disputed which of them
bore the burden of proof for it.168 In the end, the point was moot as far as
Friedrichs was concerned. At the end of its 2016 term, the Court rejected a
motion for rehearing on the case.169
The sword suspended over public union agency fees may be about to fall.
At the start of the October 2017 term, following Neil Gorsuch’s confirmation
to fill its vacant ninth seat, the Court agreed to hear Janus v. American Federation
of State, County and Municipal Employees (“AFSCME”), Council 31.170 The case
again asks the Court to overrule Abood, and most Court watchers believe that
this will happen.171
The briefs filed supporting and opposing the Janus petition for certiorari
suggest that advocates read the tea leaves in Friedrichs. For example, significant attention is given to the question of whether abolishing the mandatory
agency fee would significantly harm unions.172 In addition to defending
Abood’s reasoning, Respondents appear ready to raise again two arguments
rehearsed in Friedrichs: that the government is held to a less high burden when
it impacts free speech rights as an employer rather than a sovereign, and that
the absence of any record below makes the case a poor vehicle for overruling
a forty-year-old precedent.173 Petitioner too raises similar claims: that unions

166
167
168
169
170
171

172

173

Id. at 22–23 (quoting Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 231 (1977) (majority opinion)).
Id. at 25–26.
See Transcript of Oral Argument at 50–51, 57, Friedrichs, 136 S. Ct. 1083 (No. 14-915).
Friedrichs v. Cal. Teacher’s Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 2545 (2016) (mem.).
851 F.3d 746 (7th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Janus v. Am. Fed’n, 138 S. Ct. 54 (2017) (mem.).
Id.; see also Ross Runkel, Janus v. AFSCME Could End Public Sector “Agency Shop” Agreements, ROSS
RUNKEL REP. (Sept. 28, 2017), https://www.rossrunkelreport.com/blog/janus-v-afscme-cert (“I
don’t know anyone who thinks Abood will survive.”). The question of whether the Constitution
demands an opt-in versus an opt-out procedure to determine union membership, the second question in Friedrichs, is not presented in Janus. See Brief of Amici Curiae Rebecca Friedrichs & Freedom
Found. in Support of Petitioner at 2–4, Janus, 138 S. Ct. 54 (2017) (mem.) (No. 16-1466).
See, e.g, Brief of Amicus Curiae of the Buckeye Inst. for Pub. Policy Sols. in Support of Petitioner at
2–4, Janus, 138 S. Ct. 54 (2017) (mem.) (No. 16-1466); Brief of Amicus Curiae Mackinac Ctr. for
Pub. Policy in Support of Petitioner at 1–3, Janus, 138 S. Ct. 54 (2017) (mem.) (No. 16-1466).
Compare Brief in Opposition for Respondents Lisa Madigan & Michael Hoffman at 6, Janus, 138 S.
Ct. 54 (2017) (mem.) (No. 16-1466), with Brief for the Union Respondents at 109, Friedrichs, 136 S.
Ct. 1083 (per curiam) (No. 14-915). See also Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2653 (2014) (Kagan,
J., dissenting) (“This Court has long acknowledged that the government has wider constitutional
latitude when it is acting as employer than as sovereign.”).
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routinely engage in political activities with agency fees notwithstanding procedural safeguards established to administer Abood, and that the nature of
public unions is such that all of their activity is political and therefore one
cannot be compelled to pay for it.174 As for the “free rider” question, Petitioner disputes the underlying legislative rationale for agency fees, arguing
that many employees receive no benefit from the union and that the grant of
exclusive representation provides “advantages [that] far outweigh any minor
disadvantages that may come with exclusive representative power.”175 These
preliminary briefs do not address the line articulated in Abood between, on
the one hand, the nature of a union’s speech in public and private contexts
and the policy judgments implicated in authorizing unions in the public and
private sectors (where the Abood Court agreed distinctions could be drawn),
and, on the other, the nature of the First Amendment burden that agency
fees impose on public as opposed to private employees (where it found no
meaningful distinction).176
The deciding vote on the question of public union agency fees is now on
the Court. Widely regarded as an originalist in the mold of Justice Scalia,
Justice Gorsuch appears to take a robust view of the protections of the First
Amendment, although he has not yet considered a case that presents the
agency fee question.177 During his first few months on the Court he has consistently voted with its most conservative members.178 Officer Sam could be
forgiven for eagerly anticipating the day he can stop paying his agency fee.
D. Public Pension Contributions
A discussion of the law relevant to the pension prong of the Paycheck
Problem begins with two observations. First, there are very few cases reported
in any court in which shareholders have filed a lawsuit based on a company’s

174
175
176
177

178

Compare Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 10–13, Janus, 138 S. Ct. 54 (2017) (mem.) (No. 16-1466),
with Friedrichs Pet’r Br., supra note 158, at 9–11.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 28–29, Janus, 138 S. Ct. 54 (2017) (mem.) (No. 16-1466).
See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 232 (1977).
See id. at 211; see also Republican Party of La. v. FEC, 137 S. Ct. 2178 (2017) (noting that Justice
Gorsuch joined with Justice Thomas to dissent from the Court’s summary affirmance of a lower
court case upholding contribution limits to political parties), aff’g 219 F. Supp. 3d 86, 88–89 (D.D.C.
2016); Little Sisters of the Poor v. Burwell, 799 F.3d 1315, 1316–18 (10th Cir. 2015) (Hartz, J.,
dissenting) (reflecting that Justice Gorsuch joined a dissent that would have found filing a one-page
form to opt out of contraception coverage an unconstitutional burden of religious liberty), vacated
sub nom. Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016); Ramesh Ponnuru, Neil Gorsuch: A Worthy Heir to
Scalia, NAT’L REV. (Jan. 31, 2017), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/444437/neil-gorsuchantonin-scalia-supreme-court-textualist-originalist-heir.
See Nina Totenberg, Justice Neil Gorsuch Votes 100 Percent of the Time with Most Conservative Colleague,
NPR (July 1, 2017, 12:25 PM), http://www.npr.org/2017/07/01/535085491/justice-neil-gorsuch-votes-100-percent-of-the-time-with-most-conservative-collea.
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political spending,179 even fewer where the plaintiffs raised a First Amendment objection to such expenditures,180 and none that either my research assistants or I could locate in which the corporate shareholder (or functional
equivalent) was victorious. Second, notwithstanding this fact, the very first
amicus brief to be filed with the Supreme Court in support of the union’s
position in Friedrichs was submitted by nineteen prominent corporate law professors.181 The brief was filed to disabuse the Court of the assumption it had
made in previous cases “that if shareholders disapprove of corporate political
expression, they can easily sell their shares or exercise control over corporate
spending.”182 It is not difficult to read between the lines of the brief an awareness of the potential of the union cases to unsettle the relationship between
corporations and shareholders, including pension funds and beneficiaries.183
To understand this apparent incongruity, it is necessary to understand
the key role that the concept of “corporate democracy” has assumed in cases
that involve the constitutionality of corporations using their shareholders’
money to make political expenditures. While the dissenting shareholder has
played only a bit part in shareholder derivative actions—and for good reason, as discussed below—she has made a regular appearance in the Supreme
Court’s campaign finance cases.184
Prior to Citizens United, both corporations and unions were required to use
segregated accounts (“political action committees” or “PACs”) to make contributions to politicians and to make political independent expenditures.185

179

180

181

182
183

184

185

See Marsili v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 124 Cal. Rptr. 313, 315 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975) (addressing
whether California state law allowed corporate contribution to a political cause); Barnes v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 87, 88 (1993) (addressing whether insurance company
could spend premium revenues on political cause that some policyholders opposed); Stern v. Gen.
Elec. Co., 837 F. Supp. 72, 74 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (addressing shareholder’s claims that General Electric’s contributions to its political action committee constituted corporate waste and violation of
fiduciary duties), aff’d, 23 F.3d 746 (2d Cir. 1994).
See Barnes, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 91–94; see also Marsili, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 322 (refusing to consider
counterargument by corporation that it had a First Amendment right to make the challenged contribution).
Brief of Corporate Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 1–3, Friedrichs v.
Cal. Teachers Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016) (No. 14-915) (per curiam), 2015 WL 7068957 [hereinafter Corporate Law Professors’ Brief].
Id. at 4 n.3 (listing cases).
See, e.g., id. at 6 (“What can a shareholder do if she disagrees with a corporate expenditure, whether
on a particular business strategy or in support of a political position? The short answer is very
little.”).
See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 361–63 (2010); McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93,
204 (2003); FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 163 (2003); Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce,
494 U.S. 652, 658 (1990); FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 264 (1986); First Nat’l
Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 792–93 (1978).
See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 320–21 (citing 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2) (2006) (current version at 52
U.S.C. § 30118(b)(2) (2012))).
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Contributions to PACs are voluntary and subject to contribution limits.186 (In
addition, unions continue to have significant accounting requirements to ensure that nonmembers are not charged for other activities that are not germane
to the union’s representation.187) Citizens United, a corporation, produced
and wanted to distribute a movie attacking Hillary Clinton.188 It argued, inter
alia, that it should be able to use its general treasury funds to do so.189
In defense of the PAC requirement, the Government argued that if corporations could use their unlimited general treasury funds to support political
issues and candidates, they would put corporate investors in the position of
funding political speech—speech that the Court has long recognized lies at
the heart of the First Amendment.190 It was not writing on new ground.
Professor Adam Winkler has argued that a concern about the misuse of
“other people’s money” significantly advanced and informed early campaign
finance reform efforts.191 And in several prior cases upholding laws that limited corporate political speech, the Supreme Court in fact recognized the
concerns of dissenting shareholders.192 For example, in Austin v. Michigan
Chamber of Commerce, which upheld a state law banning corporations from using general treasury funds on independent expenditures, Justice Brennan invoked the image of a “captive stockholder of a business corporation” in his
concurrence against the corporate interests.193 He rejected the idea that
186
187

188
189
190

191

192

193

52 U.S.C. § 30118(b)(3) (2012); 52 U.S.C.A. § 30116 (West 2017).
Chi. Teacher Union, Local No. 1 v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 306–07, 310 (1986) (“We hold today
that the constitutional requirements for the Union's collection of agency fees include an adequate
explanation of the basis for the fee, a reasonably prompt opportunity to challenge the amount of
the fee before an impartial decisionmaker, and an escrow for the amounts reasonably in dispute
while such challenges are pending.”); see also Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 22, at 1038; Sachs,
supra note 19, at 861; cf. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 337.
See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 320–21.
Id.
See id. at 361 (discussing the Government’s argument “that corporate independent expenditures can
be limited because of its interest in protecting dissenting shareholders from being compelled to fund
corporate political speech”).
Adam Winkler, “Other People’s Money”: Corporations, Agency Costs, and Campaign Finance Law, 92 GEO.
L.J. 871, 876 (2004) (“[T]he early emphasis on excessive corporate power was insufficient to lead
to broad reform; it was only after the ‘other people’s money’ theme supplemented other concerns
about corporate politics and shifted the focus of public debate that the ban [on corporate political
contributions] attracted the necessary support.”).
See, e.g., FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 154 (2003) (recognizing that the ban on corporate political
contributions protected shareholders); McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 204 (2003); Austin v. Mich.
State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 663 (1990) (noting that “many of [the Chamber’s]
members may be . . . reluctant to withdraw as members even if they disagree with the Chamber's
political expression, because they wish to benefit from the Chamber’s nonpolitical programs and to
establish contacts with other members of the business community”); FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life,
Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 264 (1986) (describing the importance of persons connected with a corporation
having “no economic disincentive for disassociating with it if they disagree with its political activity”).
Austin, 494 U.S. at 674–75 (Brennan, J. concurring); see also id. at 675 (“[T]he State surely has a
compelling interest in preventing a corporation it has chartered from exploiting those who do not
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stockholder divestment could provide a remedy because that “would impose
a financial sacrifice on those objecting to political expenditures.”194
Justice Kennedy dissented in Austin, and he wrote the majority opinion in
the case that overruled it. Citizens United eliminated the PAC requirement for
everything except direct political contributions.195 Justice Kennedy explained that PACs did not reasonably accommodate competing interests because they were “burdensome,” “expensive,” and “subject to extensive regulations.”196 As for the interests of dissenting shareholders in the face of
unrestrained corporate political spending, Justice Kennedy reached back to
First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, an earlier case in which the Court had
overturned a state ban on corporate expenditures on political referenda, to
explain, with little discussion, that shareholders’ interests could be protected
“through the procedures of corporate democracy.”197
The reader who perceives a potential conflict between this logic and the
union cases described above (which nowhere reference union democracy but
do impose significant accounting responsibilities to segregate political
funds198) is not alone. Indeed, Bellotti itself had featured a strenuous dissent
by Justice White arguing that Abood had already answered the question presented—individuals could not be forced to subsidize an organization’s political speech.199 The majority there rejected the analogy because “[t]he critical
distinction here is that no shareholder has been ‘compelled’ to contribute
anything.”200 Justice White in turn observed that the “employees in Street and
Abood were also free to seek other jobs where they would not be compelled to
finance causes with which they disagreed, but we held in Abood that First
Amendment rights could not be so burdened.”201
In the Paycheck Problem, all of Sam’s payments are required by law, so
the degree of compulsion does not distinguish one from the other.202 The

194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201

202

wish to contribute to the Chamber’s political message.”).
Id. at 674.
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 365–66.
Id. at 337.
Id. at 362 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794 (1978)); see also id. at 370–71.
See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 814–19 (White, J., dissenting) (citing Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S.
209 (1977)).
Id. at 794 n.34 (majority opinion).
Id. at 818 (White, J., dissenting) (“Clearly the State has a strong interest in assuring that its citizens
are not forced to choose between supporting the propagation of views with which they disagree and
passing up investment opportunities.”).
26 U.S.C. § 3301 (2016) (requiring employers to withhold income taxes from all employees); Abood
v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977) (holding state laws may constitutionally impose the
withholding of union agency fees); NAT ’L ASS’N OF STATE RETIREMENT ADM’RS, EMPLOYEE
CONTRIBUTIONS TO PUBLIC PENSION PLANS 1 (2017), https://www.nasra.org/files/Issue%20
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question remains, however, whether corporate democracy sets compelled
subsidies of corporations apart from union dues, which brings us back to the
corporate law professors’ amicus brief in Friedrichs. A brief review may be
helpful. Corporations are, like unions, entities authorized by state law to
harness and channel the collective resources of stakeholders.203 While technically the shareholders own the capital and thus the corporation, they have
virtually no control over the corporation’s day-to-day activities, which is
vested in managers and officers.204 As with union officers, corporate officers
owe their stakeholders a fiduciary duty to, inter alia, avoid self-dealing and act
in good faith.205 Even if this were not a highly deferential standard, it requires
information to monitor. This is not the venue for a protracted discussion of
the requirements, timing, and effectiveness of corporate disclosures, but for
present purposes suffice it to say that to date the SEC has not mandated disclosure of corporate political spending.206 Nor is it likely to do so soon; the

203

204

205
206

Briefs/NASRAContribBrief.pdf (noting that almost all public sector employees are required to contribute towards public pension plans); see also supra note 98.
See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768 (2014) (“A corporation is simply a form of
organization used by human beings to achieve desired ends. An established body of law specifies
the rights and obligations of the people (including shareholders, officers, and employees) who are
associated with a corporation in one way or another. When rights, whether constitutional or statutory, are extended to corporations, the purpose is to protect the rights of these people.”).
See, e.g., Corporate Law Professors’ Brief, supra note 181, at 7 (“Indeed, a core goal of corporate law
is to give directors and officers legal authority to act in ways with which shareholders may profoundly disagree.”); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (2017) (vesting power and duties vis-à-vis
a corporation in its directors and officers); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Shining Light
on Corporate Political Spending, 101 GEO. L.J. 923, 927 (2013) (advocating for SEC rules to require
public companies to disclose their political spending because “the interests of directors and executives with respect to such spending may frequently diverge from those of shareholders”); Leo E.
Strine, Jr. & Nicholas Walter, Conservative Collision Course?: The Tension Between Conservative Corporate
Law Theory and Citizens United, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 335, 340 (2015) (“Citizens United rests on the
notion that stockholders in corporations are well positioned to exercise influence over corporate
political-spending decisions and that corporate political spending will therefore be a legitimate reflection of stockholder sentiment. But conservative corporate law theory is founded in important
part on the premise that stockholders are poorly positioned to monitor corporate managers even
for their fidelity to a profit-maximization goal. Indeed, conservative corporate law theory teaches
that it is often irrational for stockholders to exercise voice over even profit-related issues, much less
to influence a particular corporation’s approach to political spending.”).
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (2017); see also Melvin Eisenberg, The Duty of Good Faith in Corporate
Law, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (2006) (describing the duty of good faith as recognized by Delaware courts).
A rulemaking petition calling for the disclosure of corporate political spending was submitted to the
SEC in mid-2011, and as of December 2015 it had garnered more than 1.2 million comments but
no action from the agency. See Lucian Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Hindering the SEC from
Shining a Light on Political Spending, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Dec.
21, 2015), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/12/21/hindering-the-sec-from-shining-a-lighton-political-spending/ (discussing omnibus budget rider to prevent SEC from proceeding with a
rulemaking on disclosure of political spending); see also Alex Guillén, Senate Sends SEC Disclosure Rule
to the Dust Bin, POLITICO (Feb. 3, 2017, 7:06 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2017/02/senate-votes-to-kill-sec-disclosure-rule-234590 (reporting on vote to nullify SEC rule that would have
required companies to disclose payments to foreign governments).
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most recent federal budgets have barred the SEC from moving forward with
any rulemaking on disclosure of political spending.207 As a result, “[s]hareholders in most public companies in the United States do not have the information they need to determine whether the company engages in political
spending, how much is spent, or who the recipients are.”208
Even if shareholders do learn about a corporation’s spending decisions,
they would have limited recourse to object under corporate law. As Lucian
Bebchuk and Robert Jackson observed after Citizens United, “Under existing
law, political speech is governed by the same rules as ordinary business decisions, which give directors and executives virtually plenary authority.”209
Shareholders—individual or institution—have three choices to make their
displeasure felt: vote for a new board of directors, sell their shares, or sue the
company.210 Voting is of limited value.211 Many stocks are now held by
intermediaries such as pension or mutual funds, so the actual source of the
capital may not have a vote at all.212 Moreover, the likelihood of any single
investor owning enough shares to impact corporate policy is slim.213 Selling
the shares, even if an option (it is not for Sam or many investors), presents a
Hobson’s choice of staying in the market and subsidizing expression one opposes or leaving and absorbing significant financial consequences.
That leaves a lawsuit. A successful derivative lawsuit must prove a breach
of the fiduciary duty of loyalty, such as waste, fraud, or self-dealing.214 However, corporate directors can raise as a defense the “business judgment rule,”
which prevents courts from second-guessing corporate board decisions “if
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208

209
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211
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214

The 2017 budget continues to block the SEC from using any appropriated funds “to finalize, issue,
or implement any rule, regulation, or order regarding the disclosure of political contributions, contributions to tax exempt organizations, or dues paid to trade associations.” Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-31, § 635, 131 Stat. 135, 376 (2017).
Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 204, at 930. Some large institutional investors, such as pension funds,
have adopted policies recommending the disclosure of corporate political spending. See, e.g., CAL.
PUB. EMPS.’ RETIREMENT SYS., GOVERNANCE & SUSTAINABILITY PRINCIPLES ¶ III.B.7.f.iii. (Mar.
16, 2017), https://www.calpers.ca.gov/docs/forms-publications/governance-and-sustainabilityprinciples.pdf (mandating “disclos[ure] on an annual basis [of] the amounts and recipients of monetary and non-monetary contributions,” including any political spending done through intermediaries). Even this is cold comfort to the employee who provided the capital being invested.
Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 19, at 83.
See, e.g., Joseph K. Leahy, Are Corporate Super PAC Contributions Waste or Self-Dealing? A Closer Look, 79
MO. L. REV. 283, 287–89 (2014).
See Corporate Law Professors’ Brief, supra note 181, at 6–17.
See id. at 25 (showing that in 1950 more than 90% of stocks were held by individuals; that by 2009
it was less than 40%; and that most of that percentage drop reflects the rise of institutional investors,
who now own more than 50% of equities).
See id. at 10–23 (arguing that “most investors have little influence, direct or indirect, on a typical
corporate board”).
See generally Leahy, supra note 210; Joseph K. Leahy, Corporate Political Contributions as Bad Faith, 86 U.
COLO. L. REV. 477, 478, 481 (2015).
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ordinary business-persons could differ on the sufficiency of benefit received”
and if there is no motive of personal interest or self-dealing.215 As Joseph
Leahy recently explained:
[The business judgment rule] instructs courts that, rather than look at the
quality of the board’s decision (i.e., was the decision negligent?), the court should
look to integrity of the board’s decision-making process (i.e., was the decision made
in good faith, uninterested, independent, minimally informed, and not made
in a grossly negligent manner?). As a result, judges are effectively prohibited
from evaluating the merits of rational, good faith business decisions.216

It is difficult to imagine that a rule of judicial deference to corporate decision-making would trump a constitutional concern should a shareholder
pursue a First Amendment objection to corporate activity akin to the recent
union fee challenges, but that issue has not yet reached the courts, and it is
unlikely to until there is better disclosure of actual political expenses.217 It is
also not clear how a shareholder or pension participant might best assert her
rights. Since Citizens United opened avenues for corporate political spending
while dismissing shareholders’ constitutional concerns, considerable scholarship has explored whether corporate law provides avenues to respond to the
increase in corporate political spending.218 However, given the expanding
reach of the First Amendment, it may well be that shareholders can look to
constitutional law to make their case. Indeed, the crux of the Court’s opinion
in Hobby Lobby was that a company’s constitutional interest—there, religious
liberty—resides in its shareholders.219
From Sam’s vantage, the law requires him to give money to a corporation
through his pension and allows it to be spent on a range of political activities
over which he has no input or control. If “corporate democracy” does not
in fact meaningfully protect shareholders, the best defense corporations may
be able to offer against First Amendment challenges to mandatory pension
laws is to draw parallels to the mandatory agency fee provisions of federal
215
216
217

218

219

Stern v. Gen. Elec. Co., 837 F. Supp. 72,76 (S.D.N.Y 1993), aff’d, 23 F.3d 746 (2d Cir. 1994).
Leahy, supra note 210, at 298–99 (footnotes omitted).
In Barnes v. State Farm, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 87, 90 (1993), an insurance policy holder challenged the
company’s expenditures on a no-fault insurance initiative on both constitutional and corporate law
grounds. The court dismissed the constitutional claim on the merits, noting that the insurance
company also had free speech rights to be balanced and rejecting a comparison to Abood because of
“differences between compelled membership in a union and voluntary investment in a corporation.” Id. at 92, 94. It considered the corporate law claims separately, there applying the business
judgment rule. Id. at 94–95.
See generally, e.g., Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 204 (exploring the increased corporate political
spending and the possible rules that would broaden access to such information for shareholders);
William Alan Nelson II, Post-Citizens United: Using Shareholder Derivative Claims of Corporate Waste to
Challenge Corporate Independent Political Expenditures, 13 NEV. L.J. 134 (2012) (exploring how shareholders may bring derivative claims to challenge corporate political spending they find to be detrimental
to the corporation).
See supra note 203.
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labor laws.220 Thus, it would seem, the corporate law professors’ brief and
the implicit caution therein.221
To sum up the unsettled law undergirding the Paycheck Problem: the
government cannot force Sam to speak on its behalf.222 There is, however,
absolutely no constitutional problem with Sam’s being compelled to subsidize a program that constitutes government speech (even if the government
is not identified as the speaker).223 If Sam were a “quasi-government” employee, it would be a violation of his constitutional rights to be forced to pay
a fair share fee to his union, even if the union is bound to represent him and
he benefits from this representation.224 As he appears to be a “full” government employee, the Constitution allows a fair share fee to be assessed against
him but he does not have to contribute to his union’s political spending—
although the jury (or Justice) is still out on whether that is only by grace of a
teetering precedent.225 He does have to contribute to a corporation’s political speech on the same issue, however. Corporations are free to make independent expenditures for or against political candidates and engage in other
expressive activity with little, if any, obligation to protect the constitutional
rights of those who are putting up money to support the enterprise.226 Officer
Sam may find recent trends encouraging for his own purposes, but we cannot
blame him if he is left scratching his head.
The first step to resolving these issues is to develop a coherent theory of
how to approach individual claims of conscience when they seek to dismantle
or substantially undermine collective enterprises. That is the task that the
second half of this Article takes up. The next Part considers the import of
the cases discussed above on the Paycheck Problem and questions, first,
whether under current doctrine there are any solid theoretical grounds to
treat mandatory pension contributions differently than mandatory agency
fees and, second, whether the Court has articulated a coherent rationale for
setting taxes apart from these other forms of compelled subsidy.
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224
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Of course, unions remain barred from using nonmembers funds on political activity. See supra Part
I.C.1.
This analysis is my own. I know none of the authors of the corporate law professors’ amicus brief,
and it carefully avoids connecting these dots, observing only that “[i]f this Court chooses to grant
additional First Amendment rights to union nonmembers, it will only further increase the extent to
which they enjoy greater rights than do corporate shareholders.” Corporate Law Professors’ Brief,
supra note 181, at 39.
See supra text accompanying notes 40–42.
See supra text accompanying notes 82–92.
See supra text accompanying notes 130–135.
See supra text accompanying notes 177–178.
See supra text accompanying notes 195–218.
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II. RECONCILING DOCTRINE AND THEORY
The cases discussed above may simply reflect the proclivities of a procorporate, anti-union, libertarian Court. But the language used in the
Court’s recent decisions has serious implications, particularly for our ability
to address problems through collective action. In the first Subpart, I consider
grounds on which we might distinguish unions from pensions for the purposes of compelled subsidy analysis and find none. I then turn to whether
the Court’s discussion of the compulsion to fund government speech offers
solid theoretical grounds to distinguish taxes from pensions and unions and
again come up short. This is not to say that we cannot distinguish taxes from
other payments under the First Amendment, but that the Court’s focus on
the burden compelled subsidies pose to individual liberty interests has prevented it from doing so. For those who do not want to see the First Amendment used as a “blunderbuss” to dismantle collective programs, these analyses highlight some shortcomings within the current doctrine and set the
scene for the following Part, where I propose three possible paths forward.227
A. Comparing Unions and Pensions
As we have seen, the Supreme Court in recent years has glossed over
differences between compelled speech and compelled subsidy, and it has
taken an increasingly broad view of what kind of speech might trigger First
Amendment scrutiny and an increasingly constricted view of the government’s interests and the fit between the law and its intended purpose. Based
on the arguments advanced by a majority of the Justices in Knox, Harris, and
the Friedrichs oral argument, funding of not only political speech but also
speech that touches on matters of public concern and speech that has the
potential to impact the government’s budget raise constitutional issues; under
the reasoning of United Foods, compelled support for any speech, even purely
commercial speech, appears to merit, at the least, exacting scrutiny.228 It
appears only a matter of time before a public pension contributor brings a
First Amendment challenge to the requirement that he subsidize corporate
political activity or, more broadly, corporate actions affecting public policy.229 The following discussion sets union agency fees and pension contri-
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See Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Essay, A Locked Phone; Unlocked Corporate Constitutional Rights, 164 U. PA. L.
REV. ONLINE 287, 287 (2016), https://www.pennlawreview.com/online/164-U-Pa-L-RevOnline-287.pdf (discussing the Roberts Court’s “blunderbuss use of the First Amendment to invalidate key laws, including those regulating money in politics”).
United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 411 (2001); see also supra Part I.C.2–3; supra note
37 and accompanying text.
Then again, as John Oliver has observed, “if you want to do something evil, put it inside something
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butions next to each other and considers potential justifications for differential, or asymmetric, treatment. The question being considered is not what
should be done to protect the interests of dissenters—I save that for the final
Part—but simply whether there are valid grounds to distinguish agency fees
from pension contributions for First Amendment purposes.
1. The Case for Symmetry
It is not difficult to make the case for symmetrical treatment of union
agency fees and pension contributions, particularly when one considers the
percentage of pension funds that flows to corporations. Today 50% or more
of the average public pension is invested in public equities, a marked departure from the 1950s, when 96% of public pension holdings were invested in
fixed-income assets and cash.230 The most obvious point of overlap, as discussed above, is the fact that both organizations can use their accumulated
funds to make political expenditures. Yet under Abood and its progeny, nongermane union political speech cannot be funded by dissenting employees;
by contrast, under Citizens United, corporations are free to use shareholder
funds for identical political spending.231
The Supreme Court’s placating statements about dissenting contributors’
rights being safeguarded by “corporate democracy” do not provide a basis
for distinguishing corporations from unions; in fact, quite the opposite. Corporations and unions do share many features, such as regular election of directors,232 a fiduciary duty of loyalty,233 and detailed reporting requirements.234 For unions, these are set out in the Labor Management Reporting
and Disclosure Act (“LMRDA”), which also provides a detailed “bill of
rights” protecting employees’ ability to participate in the union to a greater
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boring.” Last Week Tonight (@LastWeekTonight), TWITTER (June 2, 2014, 8:21 AM),
https://twitter.com/LastWeekTonight/status/473484569757638656.
See Investment, N AT’L ASS’N OF STATE RETIREMENT ADM’RS, http://www.nasra.org/investment
(last visited Jan. 15, 2018); see also PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS & LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD FOUND.,
STATE PUBLIC PENSION INVESTMENTS SHIFT OVER PAST 30 YEARS 2 (2014), http://
www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/assets/2014/06/state_public_pension_investments_shift_over_
past_30_years.pdf (“Data from the Federal Reserve’s Financial Accounts of the United States reveal
that in 1952, nearly 96 percent of public pension assets were invested in fixed-income asset classes
and cash. By 1992, the proportion of pension assets in fixed-income investments and cash had
decreased to 47 percent, and by 2012, it had fallen to 27 percent.” (citations omitted)).
See supra notes 93–125, 195–218 and accompanying text.
29 U.S.C. § 481 (2012); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 141–42 (2017).
29 U.S.C. § 501 (2012); see, e.g., Stern v. Gen. Elec. Co., 837 F. Supp. 72, 74 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Guth
v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939).
29 U.S.C. §§ 431–441 (2012); see also Torres-Spelliscy, supra note 23, at 116 (observing that “corporations and unions have been subjected to nearly identical legal schemas” for the last six decades).
See generally DIV. OF CORP. FIN., U.S. SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, FINANCIAL REPORTING MANUAL
(2017) (providing an overview of the copious regulations that govern corporate financial disclosures).
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extent than the average shareholder—and certainly someone who invests
through a pension or mutual fund—can participate in corporate decisionmaking.235 As Catherine Fisk and Erwin Chemerinsky recently noted, “In
contrast to the extensive federal regulation of union governance and dues
collection under the LMRDA, the law of corporations gives shareholders relatively little power to control the decision making or disclosures of corporations and absolutely no power over its political speech.”236 Thus to the extent
dissenters’ free speech interests can be assuaged by referral to internal procedures, any comparison between unions and corporations suggests that these
procedures are stronger in the union context.
This disconnect has already attracted calls for better transparency and
accountability for corporate political spending.237 Even before the Court’s
opinions in Knox and Harris confirmed a widening substantive gap in how
some Justices view the rights of dissenting union-shop employees as opposed
to dissenting shareholders, commentators observed that post-Citizens United it
was structurally far more difficult for a dissenting shareholder to identify
problematic political speech and object to subsidizing it than for a dissenting
union member to do the same.238 Two prominent law review articles, one
by Professor Benjamin Sachs, and the other by Professors Fisk and Chemerinsky, engaged in thorough analyses of the Court’s holdings and considered
whether any arguments supported the differential treatment of unions and
corporations vis-à-vis their political transparency, accountability, and spending.239 Both concluded that unions and corporations should be treated the
same in these regards and, moreover, that union-shop employees and shareholders had equally valid interests in how their money was spent.240 The
authors differed, however, regarding the solution. Professor Sachs would like
to see corporations become more transparent and offer shareholders an optout or refund of political spending in line with unions’ agency fees; Professors
Fisk and Chemerinsky believe that continuing to separate the “political”
from the “germane” would be too difficult to administer for both unions and
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See Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519
(1959) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.); 29 U.S.C.A. § 411 (establishing a
“[b]ill of rights; constitution and bylaws of labor organizations”).
Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 22, at 1083–84 (“Surely that unions are compelled by law to run as
democracies and to respect the free speech rights of minorities, while corporations are not, is reason
to suggest that employees should not have greater dissenters’ rights than shareholders.”).
See, e.g., Reza Dibadj, Expressive Rights for Shareholders After Citizens United?, 46 U.S.F. L. REV. 459
(2011); Russell Mangas, Citizens United Against Dissenting Shareholders, 46 TULSA L. REV. 409 (2011);
Larry E. Ribstein, The First Amendment and Corporate Governance, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1019 (2011) .
See, e.g., Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 204 (explaining that the law currently requires unions to
disclose more information than corporations); Sachs, supra note 19.
See Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 22, at 1083–84; Sachs, supra note 19.
See Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 22, at 1080–85; Sachs, supra note 19.
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corporations and fails to recognize that these organizations have their own
First Amendment rights.241
This Article will not resolve this dispute, although it adds to the discussion. For present purposes, the salient fact is that a rising tide of scholarship—and, indeed, regulatory rumblings242—recognizes that shareholders
may have a constitutionally-protected interest infringed when their investment is used by a corporate board for political purposes in a way that is
closely analogous to the interests of an objecting union nonmember. In light
of the Court’s holdings in Knox and Harris, Sam’s concerns about his inability
to opt out of his pension seem well-placed.
What few scholars have noted is that the cases discussed above suggest
that a shareholder’s First Amendment rights may be implicated not only
when a corporation engages in political speech, but also when it merely engages in speech affecting matters of public concern or that impacts government spending.243 Recall that the Court’s decision in United Foods appeared
to indicate—as have some of its other recent holdings on speech restrictions—that it is no longer willing to provide a less exacting review to
commercial speech or economic regulations.244 There the Court found the
First Amendment implicated simply because the petitioners were required to
“subsidize speech with which they disagree,” and when given the opportunity
to soften that language in Johanns, it declined to do so.245
Sam’s objection to his pension investment is not just that the company
runs ads promoting political candidates he opposes. He does not want his
money invested in a company that promotes a product he opposes, lobbies to
advance its interests on a politically-charged topic, negotiates state contracts,
and receives taxpayer money through its government contracts. Consider
241
242
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See Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 22, at 1087; Sachs, supra note 19, at 869.
See supra note 206; see also BRUCE FREED ET AL., CTR. FOR POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY, THE
2015 CPA-ZICKLIN INDEX OF CORPORATE POLITICAL DISCLOSURE AND ACCOUNTABILITY
(2015),
http://files.politicalaccountability.net/index/CPA-Zicklin_Index_Final_with_links.pdf
(scoring companies on voluntary actions they have taken to disclose political and ideological spending).
Cf. Corporate Law Professors’ Brief, supra note 181, at 4 (“[M]ost individual shareholders cannot
obtain full information about corporate speech or political activities, even after the fact, nor can they
prevent their savings from being used to speak in ways with which they disagree.” (emphasis added)).
United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 409–10 (2001); see also Sorrell v. IMS Health
Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 570–72 (2011) (finding a Vermont statute that imposed burdens on corporate
speech to warrant heightened scrutiny); United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 467 (2010) (finding
a law that criminalizes the commercial creation, sale, or possession of certain depictions of animal
cruelty was invalid under the First Amendment).
United Foods Inc., 533 U.S. at 411; see also id. at 410 (“The subject matter of the speech may be of
interest to but a small segment of the population; yet those whose business and livelihood depend
in some way upon the product involved no doubt deem First Amendment protection to be just as
important for them as it is for other discrete, little noticed groups in a society which values the
freedom resulting from speech in all its diverse parts.”).
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these objections in light of cases we have already reviewed. In both Knox and
Harris, a majority of the Court suggested that a public employee subject to an
agency fee faced an “exacting” First Amendment burden because public union collective bargaining negotiations were “political” in that they touched on
a matter of “public concern.” For example, for proof that the home health
workers’ collective bargaining involved matters of “public concern,” Justice
Alito pointed to the fact that salary negotiations had the potential to affect
“Medicaid funding” or “state spending for employee benefits.”246
Under this logic, it is not difficult to show how pension contributions raise
compelled subsidy concerns beyond corporate political spending. Pension
money is invested in many corporations that lobby, engage in activities of
public concern, and make decisions that have the potential to significantly
impact federal or state spending programs, including Medicaid. Consider
some of the top holdings of CalPERS, the state pension fund to which California teachers are required to contribute.247 Some of the companies receiving CalPERS pension funds impact government spending directly—Johnson
& Johnson, for example, negotiates Medicaid reimbursement rates with government regulators248—while others have significant indirect impacts. For
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Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2642–43 (2014).
CalPERS Retirement Benefits, CAL. TEACHERS ASS’N, http://ctainvest.org/home/CalSTRSCalPERS/about-calpers/calpers-retirement-benefit.aspx (last visited Jan. 15, 2018).
See CALPERS, 2014–15 COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT 103 (2015) (listing Johnson & Johnson as the fourth largest holder of CalPERS stock); see also Janet Elliott, Johnson & Johnson
Settles Texas Medicaid Fraud Lawsuit for $158 Million, DALL. MORNING NEWS (Jan. 2012),
http://www.dallasnews.com/business/headlines/20120119-johnson-johnson-settles-texas-medicaid-fraud-lawsuit-for-158-million. The “top 10” list also includes companies such as JP Morgan
and Exxon Mobile, both companies that had significant impact on public budgets in recent decades.
CALPERS, supra note 248, at 103; Damian Carrington & Harry Davies, US Taxpayers Subsidising
World’s Biggest Fossil Fuel Companies, GUARDIAN (May 12, 2015, 7:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/may/12/us-taxpayers-subsidising-worlds-biggest-fossil-fuel-companies (listing state subsidies received by oil companies); Steven Davidoff, JPMorgan’s $12 Billion
Bailout, N.Y. TIMES: DEALB%K (Mar. 18, 2008, 9:22 AM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2008/03/18/jpmorgans-12-billion-bailout/ (“Even assuming that JPMorgan ultimately has to pay more for Bear than its $2-per-share-offer—a big assumption—the market’s initial
view is that this takeover of an imploding Wall Street firm was a wealth transfer to JPMorgan’s
shareholders of this amount. Where did this transfer come from? Well, it came from the Federal
Reserve and from Bear. The Federal Reserve has guaranteed Bear’s liabilities to the tune of $30
billion.”); Brendan Greeley, JPMorgan’s $10 Billion Subsidy, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (July 2,
2012, 6:05 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-07-02/jpmorgans-10-billionsubsidy (citing study estimating that from 2007 to 2010 “JPMorgan saved just under $10 billion
thanks to its size and importance”); Joanna Walters, Exxon Valdez - 25 Years After the Alaska Oil Spill,
The Court Battle Continues, TELEGRAPH (Mar. 23, 2014), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/10717219/Exxon-Valdez-25-years-after-the-Alaska-oil-spill-the-courtbattle-continues.html (noting that 25 years after the Exxon Valdez oil spill, Alaskan officials were
seeking nearly $100 million to compensate for environmental damages caused by the accident).
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example, Chevron decided in late 2015 to lay off several thousand employees,249 and Wells Fargo recently settled a case for mortgage loan violations
with the Federal Housing Administration for $1.2 billion.250 As for affecting
“state spending for employee benefits,” 82% of all public employees (including California public school teachers) are covered by a defined benefit (as
opposed to a defined contribution) pension plan, which means that if the
pension plan investments fail to perform as expected, the funds to cover the
promised benefits come from the public treasury.251 One need only review
the names of some of the companies in which public pensions invest—Apple,
Exxon Mobile, General Electric, Microsoft, Verizon—to appreciate that
these entities, and how they choose to spend their money, broadly implicate
many areas of “public concern.”252
It is fair to ask whether all corporate or pension fund activities are expressive and subject to First Amendment protection. Certainly some do not comport with our traditional understanding of “speech,” but as noted above, the
Court has long applied the First Amendment to non-speech activities with
expressive elements.253 Regardless, this argument resolves nothing. Many
corporate activities, such as promoting ideas or products, negotiating contracts, lobbying, and making and communicating a decision, are clearly expressive; many are activities, indeed, described by the Court in Harris.254 To
the extent Sam wishes to opt out of an organization’s expressive activities,
however defined, the contexts appear symmetrical.
Moreover, Sam’s compelled union and pension payments strike equally
at his autonomy interests. The personal indignation that individuals may feel
at the thought of their money going towards a negotiation that advances positions with which they disagree in the union context is of a kind with the
indignation individuals may feel about their money subsidizing decisions
made by a pension fund to, for example, invest in fossil fuels or firearms manufacturers, or the decision of a corporation in which individuals’ money is
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Shiv Mehta, Chevron to Lay Off 6000–7000 Employees, INVESTOPEDIA (Nov. 2, 2015, 9:17 AM),
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/110215/chevron-lay-60007000-employees.asp.
Brena Swanson, It’s Official: Wells Fargo Reaches Largest Settlement in FHA History, HOUSINGWIRE (Apr.
8, 2016), http://www.housingwire.com/articles/36749-its-official-wells-fargo-reaches-largest-settlement-in-fha-history.
EMP. BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., EBRI DATABOOK ON EMPLOYEE BENEFITS tbl.5.1d (2015),
https://www.ebri.org/pdf/publications/books/databook/DB.Chapter%2005.pdf.
See CALPERS, supra note 248, at 103.
See supra notes 38–45 and accompanying text.
Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2642–43 (2014); see, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S.
552, 567–71 (2011); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (“The First Amendment literally
forbids the abridgment only of ‘speech,’ but we have long recognized that its protection does not
end at the spoken or written word.”).
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invested to, for example, discriminate against LGBT employees or engage in
a corporate tax inversion.255
Of course, pension funds also provide contributing employees with a significant personal financial benefit. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, in
2015 the average state and local pension annual payment was $26,684.256 But
union membership also provides employees significant personal financial benefits. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, in 2015 full-time unionized
wage and salary workers earned an average of $980 a week; non-unionized
workers earned $776.257 At fifty-two weeks a year for thirty years, this is a
premium of $318,240. In the public sector, the advantage of being represented
by a union is, on average, $145 a week, or $226,200 over thirty years.258 Employees represented by unions also receive better benefits.259 It is not surprising
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In a recent article, James Nelson argues that the “freedom-of-conscience principle” provides
grounds for distinguishing corporations from unions because “the degree of intermediation in modern capital markets . . . render[s] claims of shareholder complicity much less compelling.” James
Nelson, Corporations, Unions, and the Illusion of Symmetry, 102 VA. L. REV. 1969, 2015 (2016). This is
a troubling argument for many reasons, not the least of which is that it suggests that the more
complex a system, the fewer constitutional rights one has when participating in it. Thus, it would
not matter for First Amendment purposes if corporations amass and spend political war chests several times greater than unions, corporations make significant undisclosed electioneering expenditures with shareholder funds, or even that employees can opt out of their union’s political activities.
This argument also rests on assumptions about what one might call “reasonable indignation” as a
trigger for constitutional rights, which would discount the interests of more politically and socially
aware investors. Salience is a difficult constitutional touchstone.
PHILLIP VIDAL, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, ANNUAL SURVEY OF PUBLIC PENSIONS: STATE- AND
LOCALLY-ADMINISTERED DEFINED BENEFIT DATA SUMMARY BRIEF: 2015, at 2 (2016),
https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2016/econ/g15-aspp-sl.pdf.
BLS 2015 LABOR DATA, supra note 3; see also JULIE ANDERSON ET AL., INST. FOR WOMEN’S POLICY
RESEARCH, BRIEFING PAPER NO. R409, THE UNION ADVANTAGE FOR WOMEN 4–9 (2015),
http://www.iwpr.org/publications/pubs/the-union-advantage-for-women (reporting that the income gap between men and women is smaller for unionized employees). These numbers do not
control for other variables. A study in 2011 did attempt to isolate the effect of right-to-work laws.
“All told, our model controls for 42 demographic, economic, geographic, and policy factors. After
controlling for this full complement of differences, we find wages in [right-to-work] states to be statistically and economically significantly lower than in non-[right-to-work] states. On average, ‘rightto-work’ laws are associated with wages—for everyone, not just union members—that are 3.2%
lower than they would be without such a law.” ELISE GOULD & HEIDI SHIERHOLZ, ECON. POLICY
INST., BRIEFING PAPER NO. 299, THE COMPENSATION PENALTY OF “RIGHT-TO-WORK” LAWS 5
(2011), http://www.epi.org/files/page/-/old/briefingpapers/BriefingPaper299.pdf.
BLS 2015 LABOR DATA, supra note 3, at tbl.4. As reported by Petitioners in Friedrichs, agency fees
for California public school teachers run about $600–650 a year, while full union membership “is
often approximately $1,000 per teacher” a year. Friedrichs Pet’r Br., supra note 158, at 7. This can
be up to 2% of an entry-level salary, and presumably less as they become more senior. Id. Pension
contributions, by contrast, are set at 7% of a teacher’s salary throughout their career. CalPERS
Retirement Benefits, CAL. TEACHERS ASS’N, http://ctainvest.org/home/CalSTRS-CalPERS/aboutcalpers/calpers-retirement-benefit.aspx (last visited Jan. 15, 2018).
See George Long, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Differences Between Union and Nonunion Compensation,
2001–2011, MONTHLY LABOR REV., Apr. 2013, at 17, https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2013/
04/art2full.pdf (reporting that in 2011 unionized employees received employee benefits worth
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that, according to counsel at the Friedrichs oral argument, “Ms. Friedrichs has
said publicly she’s happy with the positions the union is taking on pay.”260
To the extent one is concerned about a dissenting union-shop employee
subsidizing union political speech, a very similar concern arises in the pension context. Likewise, to the extent one is concerned about a dissenting
union-shop employee subsidizing union activities that affect matters of public
concern or the public fisc, pension contributions are also implicated. The
question is whether there are any good justifications for not treating these
instances of compelled subsidy the same for First Amendment purposes.
2. The Case for Asymmetry
We can begin by looking at some of the potential grounds for distinction
that have already been discussed in legal scholarship. In his analysis of corporate political spending in the wake of Citizens United, Professor Sachs argued
that shareholders should be given the opportunity to opt out of corporate political spending in a manner analogous to the opt-out allowed union nonmembers.261 He considered and rejected three sets of arguments for treating the
corporate and union contexts differently. Two of these—the degree of compulsion and the presence of state action—are not implicated in the Paycheck
Problem, where contributions to the public pension fund are required by law
as a term of state employment.262 The third—“potential differences between
the kinds of speech and associational rights that are implicated in the union
and corporate contexts”—is worth examining more closely.263
Professor Sachs identified two differences in kind between unions and corporations that could be relevant to fine-tuning an opt-out right in each context. The first is the nature of the association. While unions may strike one
as expressive organizations and corporations commercial ones, in fact—and
as the Supreme Court has recognized—both are mixed-purpose entities, with
both economic and expressive functions.264 However, to the extent that un-
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$7.11 an hour more than benefits received by non-unionized employees).
Transcript of Oral Argument at 62, Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016) (per
curiam) (No. 14-915).
Sachs, supra note 19, at 851.
See NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE RETIREMENT ADM’RS, NASRA ISSUE BRIEF: EMPLOYEE
CONTRIBUTIONS TO PUBLIC PENSION PLANS app. A (2017), http://www.nasra.org/files/Issue%20Briefs/NASRAContribBrief.pdf (listing the percentage of income various public employees
are required to contribute to their pension). Professors Fisk and Chemerinksy also consider state
action as a potential basis for separate treatment. Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 22, at 1080–85.
Their second ground for distinction—democratic protections—is discussed above as it appears to be
more of a symmetry than an asymmetry. See id. at 1081–84; supra note 236 and accompanying text.
Sachs, supra note 19, at 851.
Id. (citing, inter alia, FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 264 (1986), to demonstrate
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ions engage not just in political expression but also in the germination of political ideas—and to the extent that corporations do not fill the same role in
shaping public opinion265—Professor Sachs suggests that union nonmembers
might be afforded greater opt-out rights than shareholders, as potentially
more union activity could be considered political.266 Even if this distinction
has merit, it speaks to a question of degrees. It does not undercut the point
that compelled subsidy arguments would apply in the corporate context.267
The second difference Professor Sachs identifies is that as a matter of salience and personal identity, some attach greater significance to being a union
member than to being a corporate shareholder.268 But again, even if true, this
might provide an additional cause of action for an employee whose identity is
tightly bound with the union; it would not support ignoring the First Amendment rights of corporate shareholders. It is also difficult to see why payment
of agency fees by nonmembers makes their relationship to the organization
more salient or burdensome than, in our case, pension contributions. No one
is required to be a member of a union. To the extent that payment of an
agency fee does lead to union speech being actually attributed to a nonmember—the functional equivalent of putting words into the employee’s mouth—
this could mean that in the union context both compelled subsidization and
compelled speech arguments are implicated, while in the corporate context
only compelled subsidization would provide a basis for complaint. As Professor Sachs notes, however, under the Supreme Court’s current cases “either
type of objection is sufficient for First Amendment purposes.”269
The differences identified by Professor Sachs offer potential analytical
nuances in how we think about mandatory contributions to corporations and
unions, but they do not change the fact that similar First Amendment interests arise in both the corporate and union contexts vis-à-vis political spending. Below I consider a few additional arguments for treating the compelled
subsidy of speech in these two areas asymmetrically.
One argument goes not to whether the First Amendment is implicated
but whether the compelled subsidization should be found unconstitutional
under a balancing test: if objecting pension contributors were allowed to opt

265

266
267
268
269

that the Court understands that “the predominant purpose of both [corporations and unions] is
economic”).
But see Michelle Conlin & Lucas Iberico Lozada, The New U.S. Office Politics: Funding Your Boss’s Political Causes, REUTERS (May 11, 2015, 9:01 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-electionworkers-insight-idUSKBN0NW0AC20150511 (reporting on a sharp uptick by employers encouraging their employees to make political donations to particular candidates). Such germination occurs in the employer-employee context, however, not the corporation-shareholder context.
Sachs, supra note 19, at 851.
Id.
Id. at 855.
Id. at 858.
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out of pension payments, there would be significant externalities in that the
cost would be borne by the taxpayer.270 This is because the vast majority of
public pensions are still defined benefit plans, in which the payout to the
beneficiary is fixed regardless of the amount of money invested in the plan or
the plan’s returns on investment.271 There are three ways to frame this concern: that allowing the opt-out would hurt the public fisc (in that it would be
required to do more with less); that it would hurt taxpayers (in that they
would be required to pay more to maintain the required benefit level); or that
it would hurt other employees (whose own pension contributions may be increased to make up for the shortfall).
These are three potential government interests that could be framed as
compelling, but they are not much different than the government interests
that have been raised in the union cases (they also bear close parallels to interests the Court recently rejected in Hobby Lobby272). To take them in reverse
order, the concern that allowing an opt-out would result in negative externalities for similarly-situated employees is identical in both contexts; both
would be asked to bear additional costs, while their dissenting colleagues
would reap the benefits without paying. The concerns about the impact on
taxpayers and on the public fisc is similar in both contexts, although not the
same. The connection between allowing opt-outs and the effect on the public
treasury is cleaner in the pension context, as the commitment to the beneficiary has already been established. In the union context, the nature and distribution of the costs involves legislative judgments, but these are exactly the
kind of decisions to which the judiciary traditionally defers.273 We will leave
to one side suggestions by Justice Scalia in the Friedrichs oral argument that
any shortfall that the CTA experienced as a result of lost agency fee revenue
could be made up by government (taxpayer) funding274—a suggestion that
would allow a direct parallel to the pension context but was rejected out of
hand by the union’s counsel as antithetical to the notion of collective bargaining.275 The government’s interests in maintaining “labor peace” and
270

271
272
273
274

275

But see United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544 (2012) (“[T]his Court has rejected as ‘startling and dangerous’ a ‘free-floating test for First Amendment coverage . . . [based on] an ad hoc
balancing of relative social costs and benefits.’” (quoting United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460,
470 (2010))).
See supra note 251.
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2780–82 (2014).
See, e.g., Ry. Emp. Dep’t v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 234–36 (1956) (finding that “the question is one
of policy with which the judiciary has no concern”).
See Transcript of Oral Argument at 27, Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016)
(per curiam) (No. 14-915) (asking if government funding of a union would be “bargainable”—“It’s
never existed in American society” was, in part, counsel’s response); see also Aaron Tang, Public Sector
Unions, the First Amendment, and the Costs of Collective Bargaining, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 144 (2016) (proposing a “government-payer alternative” to union agency fees).
See Transcript of Oral Argument at 27–28, Friedrichs, 136 S. Ct. 1083 (No. 14-915) (arguing that a
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preventing “free riding” ultimately reflect a determination by the state or
locality that the costs of negotiating and administering a set of employee contracts without a compulsory union is greater than doing so with a union. The
legislature may base this judgment on many factors, including the potential
costs of declining union representation,276 the potential costs of workplace
protests,277 or the potential costs of training and equipment that the union
would no longer be able to offer.278 Or it may simply see the disadvantage
of separately negotiating, in the case of the CTA, more than 325,000 individual contracts.279 As demonstrated in the briefs filed in the Friedrichs case,
economic data can be martialed on both sides—employees in “right to work”
states, for example, are less likely to receive pensions or health insurance,
creating costs that may be borne by other taxpayers,280 yet many of these
states have lower average tax rates281—but the point of this exercise is not to
resolve the economic impact of labor laws, merely to say that governments
that support agency fees may have reasonable financial interests for keeping

276

277

278

279
280

281

public employer could not “all of a sudden say, sure, we’re going to take our taxpayer dollars and
start giving money to unions”); see also id. at 40. Justice Scalia also mentioned at the oral argument
that federal unions do not charge nonmembers agency fees. Id at 50. This is true, but federal law
permits employee union representatives to work on union matters during their regular working
hours, meaning that taxpayers are literally subsidizing federal unions. See, e.g., F. Vincent
Vernuccio & Trey Kovacs, Official Time: Government Workers Perform Union Duties on the Taxpayers’ Dime,
COMPETITIVE ENTERP. INST. (Nov. 1, 2011), https://cei.org/content/official-time-governmentworkers-perform-union-duties-taxpayers%E2%80%99-dime (describing how “[t]here is no law or
regulation requiring the government to determine and report how much time union members
spend on union work at the public’s expense”).
See, e.g., Jenn Hagedorn et al., The Role of Labor Unions in Creating Working Conditions That Promote Public
Health, 106 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 989 (2016) (associating the decline of union power with the “greatest level of economic inequity in our nation’s history”).
See, e.g., Brief for the Attorney General of California at 8, Friedrichs, 136 S. Ct. 1083 (No. 14-915)
(“[E]xclusive representation can provide an efficient mechanism for school employers to learn
about employee needs, to resolve issues that could otherwise cause conflict in the workplace . . . .”).
See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 57–58, Friedrichs, 136 S. Ct. 1083 (No. 14-915) (arguing
that “[i]t’s actually essential to have agency fees, because they are using those fees to benefit all of
the workers in the—in the unit through getting additional equipment that the county may not be
able to afford, additional training . . . .”).
About Us, CAL. TEACHERS ASS’N, http://www.cta.org/About-CTA/Who-We-Are/CTA-FactSheet.aspx (last visited Jan. 15, 2017).
See GOULD & SHIERHOLZ, supra note 257, at 6. Compare Brief of Amici Curiae State of Michigan
and Seventeen Other States in Support of Petitioners at 9–20, Friedrichs, 136 S. Ct. 1083 (No. 14915) (relying on economic data to blame municipal bankruptcies, in part, on public unions), with
Brief for Cities, Counties, and Elected Officials as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 18–
29, Friedrichs, 136 S. Ct. 1083 (No. 14-915) (relying on economic data to argue that public unions
promote efficiency and save tax dollars).
See Tax Burdens Lighter in Right to Work States, NAT ’L RIGHT TO WORK COMMITTEE (Apr. 6, 2015),
https://nrtwc.org/tax-burdens-lighter-in-right-to-work-states; see also Tamara Kay, The Lies, Damn
Lies, and Statistics Behind the Boom in America’s Right-to-Work Laws, QUARTZ (May 1, 2015),
http://qz.com/396598/the-lies-damn-lies-and-statistics-behind-the-boom-in-americas-right-towork-laws/ (arguing that “right-to-work laws result in lower wages and lower likelihood of health
care and pensions for union and non-union workers”).
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them in place. It would take some overreach for the judiciary to supplant
legislative judgment on a question of fiscal impact.282
Of course, the argument above rests on the troubling presumption that a
First Amendment right could be abrogated for purely economic reasons.283
Likewise, an argument that pension funds and corporations have, by virtue
of corporate and pension law, a fiduciary duty that already safeguards a contributor’s money is both, at some levels, non-responsive to the symmetry inquiry—unions also have fiduciary duties and reporting requirements284—
and suggests a hierarchy of analysis that places fiduciary protections over
constitutional ones.285 A more powerful expression of a government interest
in preventing externalities, and one that a few labor law scholars have advanced in recent years, would recognize that allowing an opt-out would create a class of what I have elsewhere termed “unwilling donors,” who themselves have a First Amendment interest in not being compelled to subsidize
speech in support of non-contributors.286 This does not serve, however, to
distinguish pension payments from union payments; so long as the unions or
pension funds are required to distribute benefits equally among contributors
and non-contributors, an unwilling donor problem will exist, and First
Amendment issues appear on both sides.
A final argument for asymmetric treatment of unions and pension payments is the possibility that the government would be able to assert that the
actions of the pension fund and, by virtue of the pension fund’s intervention,
the corporation, are government speech and thus not susceptible to First
Amendment challenges. At the Friedrichs oral argument, Respondents answered in the negative when asked whether unions were governmental actors
for the purposes of the government speech doctrine.287 For present purposes,
282
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284

285

286

287

But see Jennifer Mason McAward, Foreword, The Confident Court, 47 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 379, 379
(2012) (observing that “a majority of the Supreme Court is increasingly willing to supplant both the
prudential and legal judgments of other institutional actors”).
This is not to say that fiscal impact has no place in a constitutional analysis, but it does not alone
manifest a compelling interest. Cf. United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405 (2001) (overturning a collective marketing program).
See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 431–441 (2012) (setting forth reporting requirements for unions); OFFICE OF
LABOR-MGMT. STANDARDS, U.S DEP’T OF LABOR, RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER THE
LMRDA AND CSRA 8–9 (2009), https://www.dol.gov/olms/regs/compliance/rights_resps.pdf
(listing a union officer’s fiduciary obligations).
Cf. Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 231 (1985) (White, J., concurring) (“Surely it cannot be said, for
example, that if Congress were to declare editorial writers fiduciaries for their readers and establish
a licensing scheme under which ‘unqualified’ writers were forbidden to publish, this Court would
be powerless to hold that the legislation violated the First Amendment.”).
See, e.g., Estlund, supra note 95; Fisk & Poueymirou, supra note 28; cf. Jennifer Mueller, The Unwilling
Donor, 90 WASH. L. REV. 1783 (2015) (arguing that campaign finance jurisprudence should broaden
to take into account the interests of donors who feel “shaken down”).
Transcript of Oral Argument at 23–25, Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016)
(per curiam) (No. 14-915).
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we need not exhaustively analyze what does and does not—or should and
should not—constitute government speech.288 Happily, the instant question
already has been examined in some depth. In response to Citizens United,
Professor Eric Alden considered whether individuals compelled to contribute
to public pensions could raise First Amendment objections to corporate political activity, answering the question in the affirmative.289 In doing so, he
evaluated the potential counterargument that public pensions—with particular reference to CalPERS—should be shielded by the government speech
doctrine.290 In brief, Professor Alden compared the agricultural marketing
scheme at issue in Johanns—which was found to constitute government
speech—and the state bar at issue in Keller—which was found, despite being
considered a state agency in other contexts, not to engage in government
speech—and determined that in structure, governance, and independence,
the state pension fund operates too independently for its actions to be considered government speech.291
There is, of course, a paradox embedded in this last argument, and in
suggestions that the government could—and perhaps should—subsidize union activities directly.292 Why are we so concerned about protecting the
rights of dissenters qua employees who object to union speech while at the
same time those same dissenters qua taxpayers would have no ability to refuse to pay for essentially the same speech?
The next Subpart considers possible explanations for this dichotomy.
The analysis reveals not that taxes are not unique, but that, as articulated,
the Supreme Court’s theory of the First Amendment’s protections fails to
capture what makes them so. This in turn leads to suggestions in the final
Part of this Article for how the Supreme Court might move forward with a
more robust limiting principle in its First Amendment cases.

288
289
290
291

292

See Finseth Alden, supra note 19, at 290.
Id. at 333–45.
Id. at 344.
See id at 331–44 (developing an “independent instrumentality” test to determine if speech qualifies
as government speech: “If a body or organization established by statute is governed administratively
in a manner not subject to effective control by the executive branch of government (and not subject
to detailed statutory prescription of the precise content of its political and ideological activities and
messages), that body or organization should be regarded as an independent public instrumentality
with sufficient autonomy in its operations that its political and ideological activities should be regarded as its own and not necessarily ascribed to the government generally for purposes of the
government speech doctrine.”); see also Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 555, 560–
65 (2005) (plurality opinion); Keller v. State Bar, 496 U.S. 1, 14 (1990).
See supra note 274 (discussing the feasibility of union funding coming from the employer rather than
members).
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B. Considering the Case for “Tax Exceptionalism” in Compelled Subsidy of Speech
Cases
1. The Court’s Justifications Do Not Provide Grounds to Distinguish Taxes from
Pensions and Unions
To start with the obvious: the U.S. tax system is massive. The Internal
Revenue Code weighs in at nearly four million words, and in 2016 nearly 140
million tax returns were filed.293 The analysis below, however, proceeds from
the assumption that this characteristic alone distinguishes the tax system from
unions and pensions only as a matter of degree, not kind. “Too big to opt
out” is not a satisfying constitutional principle. The question is whether there
is a more meaningful basis for distinction and, if so, what that might mean for
the Court’s future First Amendment cases. What is remarkable is not that
such a basis exists—I suggest one below—but that the Court has not articulated one, hence its “ipse dixit” creation of the government speech doctrine.294
Let us consider the reasons the Court has provided in recent years for
refusing to grant taxpayers “opt outs,” starting with United States v. Lee, where
the Court declined to exempt an Amish employer from the Social Security
tax.295 First were administrative considerations. The argument, as paraphrased in Hobby Lobby, was that “allowing taxpayers to withhold a portion
of their tax obligations on religious grounds would lead to chaos.”296 Relatedly, the Lee majority argued that opening the door to religious challenges
would undermine the effectiveness of the tax system.297
Increasing the complexity of the U.S. tax system has not deterred policymakers to date—indeed, the Social Security system itself accommodates individual
religious objections—nor did it deter the Court in Hobby Lobby.298 It is difficult
293

294
295
296

297
298

TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP’T OF TREAS., 2017-40014, RESULTS OF THE 2016 FILING SEASON 1 (2017), https://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2017reports/201740014fr.pdf; 1 TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV., THE COMPLEXITY OF
THE TAX CODE 6 (2012) [hereinafter TAS Report], http://www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/2012annual-report/downloads/most-serious-problems-tax-code-complexity.pdf.
Post, supra note 29, at 197.
455 U.S. 252 (1982).
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2784 (2014); see also Lee, 455 U.S. at 263
(Stevens, J., concurring) (opining that although Mr. Lee’s challenge could presumably be easily
accommodated—the statute already excepted self-employed Amish people—opening the door to
these types of challenges would open the door to all sorts of “difficulties associated with processing
other claims to tax exemption on religious grounds”). The Hobby Lobby Court, by contrast, rejected
the possibility that its decision could similarly “lead to a flood of religious objections regarding a
wide variety of medical procedures and drugs.” Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2783.
Lee, 455 U.S. at 260 (“The tax system could not function if denominations were allowed to challenge
the tax system because tax payments were spent in a manner that violates their religious belief.”).
See, e.g., TAS Report, supra note 293 (“There have been approximately 4,680 changes to the tax
code since 2001, an average of more than one a day.”); see also supra note 61; cf. Hobby Lobby, 134 S.
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to see how allowing additional exemptions would create a significantly greater
burden than the Internal Revenue Code already imposes. Further, to the extent
the burden of administering an opt-out is a valid concern, it is not unique to the
world of federal taxes. Unions and pension funds are already required to engage
in complicated accounting and reporting that distinguishes, for example, between germane and non-germane expenditures in the union context and between categories of employees and fiscal obligations in the pension context.299
Allowing an opt-out for certain taxpayers or employees would certainly be burdensome, but it is not readily apparent why the comparative administrative burden would be significantly greater in one context than another.
Similarly, it is difficult to reconcile the Lee Court’s assumption that allowing an expanded religious opt-out would jeopardize a “comprehensive
scheme,” presumably because the Government would not receive adequate
funding if an opt-out were permitted, with the “but-for” version of the least
restrictive means test that animates the Court’s recent union decisions.300
Rational people would prefer to get something for free, and so it is safe to
assume that whether one is talking about taxes, agency fees, or pension contributions, if given the option of not paying while retaining the benefit, many
would choose to do so. The reason that we developed a system of laws is the
recognition of the limits of self-interest as a social organizing principle.301 It
is not clear why this risk to a “comprehensive scheme” poses a greater threat
to the general treasury than to unions or pensions or why the burden of proof
or assumptions about the continued vitality of programs in the absence of full
funding should be different in the different contexts.302
A related justification offered in Lee was the concern that “[g]ranting an
exemption from social security taxes to an employer operates to impose the
employer’s religious faith on the employees,”303 or, more accurately, it makes
employees bear the cost of their employer’s religious views. Similarly, in the
case of a tax, union, or pension dissenter, an exemption would force others

299

300
301
302
303

Ct. at 2783 (allowing certain employers a religious-based exemption).
See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 411 (2012); CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 20220–20239 (West 2017); supra notes 232–
235 and accompanying text. But see supra note 196 and accompanying text (noting that in Citizens
United the Supreme Court struck down the PAC requirement for corporate independent expenditures as overly “burdensome”).
See supra notes 141–144 and accompanying text.
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison); Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162
SCIENCE 1243, 1244 (1968) (“Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all.”).
If anything, the general treasury fund created from taxes is a larger pool than unions or corporations, and the federal government seems better positioned to make up any shortfall.
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982). But see Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2782–83 (finding
that because female employees could obtain contraception coverage elsewhere, this concern was
not triggered). Contra id. at 2799–803 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Impeding women’s receipt of benefits ‘by requiring them to take steps to learn about, and to sign up for, a new [government funded
and administered] health benefit’ was scarcely what Congress contemplated.”).
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to internalize greater expenses, spending their money to subsidize the dissenter’s right to opt out. Whether one thinks about this as a First Amendment or a Takings Clause problem, it is not obvious why different assumptions would apply to a tax opt-out, or why the externalities would be different
than in the context of agency fees or pension payments.304 Indeed, in the
latter cases the impact on individual participants would be more acute as it
would be less diffuse (i.e., not shared across the entire tax base).
Another justification offered by the Court in Lee is perhaps its most provocative: “When followers of a particular sect enter into commercial activity as a
matter of choice, the limits they accept on their own conduct as a matter of
conscience and faith are not to be superimposed on the statutory schemes
which are binding on others in that activity.”305 This contention turns on its
head the argument that a subsidy has been illegally compelled by questioning
the argument’s very premise; viz., compulsion. This is not the venue to determine whether an individual can realistically avoid taxes, unionized employment, or a mandatory pension scheme, but two points bear noting. First, to
the extent the Lee rationale that one who willingly enters a system is bound by
its terms holds, it applies equally to unions and pensions. Second, to the extent
that a greater degree of compulsion triggers greater First Amendment scrutiny
because the dissenter has no realistic avenue to sail clear of the system, taxes
raise a greater, not lesser, concern as they are far more difficult to avoid.
The Lee Court also emphasized that deference was due to legislative judgments about the need for the funding mandate and the lines drawn in the
granting of exemptions.306 This in itself is more a rule of decision-making
rather than a theory of decision, and of course public unions and public pension plans are also creatures of a democratically-elected legislature.
This point does foreshadow, however, yet another possible distinction between the compulsion to pay taxes and the compulsion to fund unions and
pensions, one that appears in the Court’s more recent government speech
cases.307 The majority in Johanns explained that the new doctrine was supported by “democratic accountability,” or the notion that government speech
304

305
306

307

See Sweeney v. Pence, 767 F.3d 654, 683 (7th Cir. 2014) (Wood, J., dissenting) (“If . . . one were to
conclude that Indiana has worked out a way to conscript the union into providing uncompensated
services to anyone who decides to opt out of union membership, it would become necessary to
decide whether such a rule is permissible under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, as
applied to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment.”); see also U.S. C ONST. amend. V, § 5
(“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”).
Lee, 455 U.S. at 261.
Id. at 260–61; see also Adams v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 170 F.3d 173, 180 (3d Cir. 1999)
(“[T]ax exemptions are a matter of legislative grace. It does not follow from Congressional action
on such matters that the Commissioner or the courts are therefore encouraged to carve out exceptions to the statutory scheme.” (citations omitted)).
See, e.g., Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 468 (2009); Johanns v. Livestock Mktg.

616

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 20:3

reflects the will of the people as expressed in the voting booth.308 As Justice
Souter pointed out in his dissent, it is not clear how well this justification actually aligned with the facts of Johanns.309 In addition, the argument may prove
too much. While the Supreme Court has held that an individual does not have
standing to challenge a federal spending program merely by the virtue of being
a taxpayer, in the Court’s compelled speech (as opposed to its compelled subsidy) cases, the fact that laws compelling, for example, recitation of the Pledge
of Allegiance were passed by democratically elected officials did not save them
from review and rejection.310 Being able to “vote the bums out” is a limited,
after-the-fact remedy. Moreover, many taxpayers—including immigrants,
foreign nationals, residents of the District of Columbia, and corporations—do
not have voting rights but are still required to pay federal tax.
As a basis for distinguishing this prong of the Paycheck Problem, “democratic accountability” offers, again, a difference in degree rather than kind.
As discussed above, both unions and corporations provide some form of internal “democracy,” with procedural protections more robust in the union
context. While this satisfies the Court in the corporate context with regard
to all spending, even political, it appears that it provides no assurances with
regards to any union functions. The word “democracy” does not even appear in Harris. The Court’s reliance on democratic safeguards to justify compelled subsidies is sporadic at best.
2. A Meaningful Distinction
The rationales offered above do not provide a sound basis for distinguishing objections to being compelled to pay one’s taxes from an objection to
contributing to a collective bargaining fund or pension plan. This is because
they also share another commonality: they all proceed from the assumption
that the First Amendment harm done by the compelled payment is to one’s
autonomy, or liberty, interests. Even the justification of “democratic accountability” appears designed to assuage the indignant individual, not offer
a chance of meaningful participation in a spending decision. But autonomy
does not, and cannot, distinguish one government compulsion from the next.
Once we move past thinking of the Paycheck Problem through the frame
of how the compelled payments burden Sam’s personal liberty, the reason
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309
310

Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 563 (2005) (plurality opinion) (“Some of our cases have justified compelled
funding of government speech by pointing out that government speech is subject to democratic
accountability.”).
Id. at 563.
Id. at 577 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that “the Beef Act does not establish an advertising scheme
subject to effective democratic checks”).
W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943) (“[No one] who acts under color of
law is beyond the reach of the Constitution.”); Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 486 (1923).
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that taxes are different than unions or pensions is obvious.311 The First
Amendment was designed in the furtherance of a larger purpose: to establish
the conditions necessary for government to be legitimate and effective. Allowing anyone with an objection to refuse to contribute to the enterprise
would threaten not just a regulatory system, but our constitutional structure.
It would functionally replace majority rule with a widely dispersed minority
veto power, undermining the system of representative democracy established
by the Constitution.312
This leads to a few further observations. First, the Court is not unaware
of this argument. It was raised in Justice Breyer’s dissent in United Foods
quoted above,313 and in dicta twenty-eight years ago in Keller, the challenge
to mandatory state bar fees:
If every citizen were to have a right to insist that no one paid by public funds
express a view with which he disagreed, debate over issues of great concern
to the public would be limited to those in the private sector, and the process
of government as we know it radically transformed.314

But it appears rarely, seldom in the majority, and as a supporting rather
than decisive factor. As a matter of First Amendment doctrine, one finds at
best “scattered references” to this constitutional purpose of democratic legitimacy, so prominent in campaign finance cases and even beginning to
infuse commercial speech cases, in the Court’s compelled subsidization
cases.315 Indeed, even though Justice Souter cited Keller in his dissent in Johanns, he appeared to view it as a pragmatic rather than constitutional consideration.316 This may be because of the roots of the compelled subsidy
doctrine in the Court’s compelled speech cases, which were heavily concerned with individual liberty interests.
Second, as demonstrated by the analysis above, First Amendment autonomy objections provide a poor touchstone to evaluate compelled subsidies to
collective schemes. As Dean Robert Post has observed, “The difficulty with
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See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison); Richard Pildes, Romanticizing Democracy, Political Fragmentation, and the Decline of American Government, 124 YALE L. J. 804, 807 (2014) (suggesting that
“[rights-oriented] approaches can spawn, and have spawned, doctrines and policies that undermine
the capacity of the democratic system as a whole to function effectively”).
See supra note 79.
Keller v. State Bar, 496 U.S. 1, 12–13 (1990); see also Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209,
259 n.13 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring in judgment) (“[T]he reason for permitting the government
to compel the payment of taxes and to spend money on controversial projects is that the government is representative of the people.”).
Gregory Klass, The Very Idea of a First Amendment Right Against Compelled Subsidization, 38 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 1087, 1127–28 (2005) (noting that “these have remained voices in the wilderness, as most
justices and many commentators still hold fast to the idea that the harm is to individual dissenters”).
Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 574 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting) (“To govern,
government has to say something.”).
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regarding autonomy as a fundamental First Amendment interest is that it is
omnipresent; every restriction and compulsion will to some degree compromise autonomy.”317 The problem is not just that entertaining autonomy objections fails to offer a limiting principle for the Paycheck Problem; it is that
it tilts towards anarchy.318 Taken to their logical limits, “conscience” objections may have the effect of actually working against what most recognize to
be the primary purpose of the First Amendment—to preserve, in the words
of the Buckley Court, “discussion of public issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates.”319
Third, “freedom of belief” objections to compelled subsidy cases shortcircuit the traditional First Amendment free speech balancing test. It is not
clear what kind of work tailoring can do when a “conscience” objection is
raised. When access to the marketplace of ideas is limited, a reasonable “tailoring” question may be whether the claimant has other ways to make his or
her voice heard. Tax resisters, for example, retain the ability to petition the
government, seek to change the legislature, post their views on line, or engage
in other democratic activities. Union dissenters can speak up at school board
meetings, write their representative, or even file a high-profile lawsuit. When
the objection is that a law infringes on one’s concept of self, however, there
is no ready work-around.320 Indeed, the best way to explain the restrictive
“but-for” test the Court applied in Harris is to understand the agency fee as
impeding an individual’s sense of personal autonomy rather than her access
to the “marketplace of ideas.”
The Court’s expansive First Amendment penumbra, its heightened scrutiny for even the most “mundane” or indirect of communications, and its
emphasis on the role of the First Amendment as a defender of individual
autonomy threatens to spark a deregulatory cascade. But this may merely
be a parade of horribles (or an argument for reversing course in the union
cases). With a new ninth Justice, the Supreme Court is, perhaps, at a crossroads. The next Part contemplates a new path forward.
III. THE PATH FORWARD: THREE OPTIONS
The discussion above reveals the line-drawing challenges inherent in a
First Amendment jurisprudence based on individual autonomy interests. It
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Post, supra note 29, at 226.
Cf. Micah Schwartzman, Conscience, Speech, and Money, 97 VA. L. REV. 317, 341 (2011).
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976); see also id. (“[T]here is practically universal agreement that
a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs.”
(quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966))).
See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring) (recognizing that
the “clash between appellee’s religious obligation and his civic obligation is irreconcilable”).
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also demonstrates that current Supreme Court jurisprudence provides a theoretical basis for Sam, or any public employee, to assert opt-out rights under
the First Amendment as to both his union and pension payments. This result
may please pure libertarians (and, of course, Sam), but it is unlikely to satisfy
the vast majority of those who recognize the value of external constraints to
solve structural issues in the marketplace and in governance. The purpose
of engaging in the analysis above is not to green-light thousands of lawsuits
by employees unhappy with how their money is spent. It was to illustrate
that in seeking to avoid one “slippery slope”—“ad hoc” balancing of First
Amendment rights and insidious governmental limits on expression—the
Court is heading towards another, one in which speech, conduct, and money
are so muddled that a large swath of government regulation is constitutionally suspect.321 The discussion below suggests three paths forward and considers how the Paycheck Problem might be resolved under each of them.
A. The “Functional” Path
One approach the Court might take would be to pull back from some of
its more recent and expansive statements of First Amendment rights and reestablish lines drawn in earlier cases that distinguish among kinds of speech,
burden, speakers, and scrutiny level, returning to the framework that guided
First Amendment analysis for several decades. Of particular relevance to the
Paycheck Problem, under this approach the Court would re-affirm the notion
that laws regulating commercial speech receives more permissive review than
those affecting political speech, and it would recognize that the government
gets more latitude when it restricts speech while acting as an employer than it
does when acting as a sovereign.322
The Court would also wind back the language in Knox and Harris (and
suggested in Hobby Lobby) equating compelled funding with compelled speech
and recognize that requiring someone to pay something is meaningfully different than requiring someone to do something.323 Until Knox and Harris, the
Supreme Court had observed this distinction. For example, while the government can require Sam to pay taxes, it cannot require him to recite the
Pledge of Allegiance, recite an oath promising not to overthrow the government, or expressly oppose prostitution.324
321
322
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See supra note 270.
See, e.g., Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (setting
forth the “Pickering principle,” allowing the government to impose speech restrictions as a condition
of public employment that it could not impose under the First Amendment); see also Harris v. Quinn,
134 S. Ct. 2618, 2654–56 (2014) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (discussing the relevance of the Pickering
principle to the question of mandatory agency fees for public unions).
See supra notes 43–45 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Agency for Int’l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2321, 2331–32 (2013);
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Scholars who have analyzed the issue of indirect speech have reached a
similar conclusion. Shortly after United Foods was decided, Gregory Klass
sought to identify the constitutional right infringed in compelled subsidy of
speech cases.325 He considered and rejected two possibilities: that a compelled subsidy interest is rooted in an individual’s freedom of belief (as articulated in Abood) or in an individual’s freedom of speech (as implied in Buckley).
As to the former, Klass observed that while “it is often central to our most
deeply held beliefs that we be able to express them in words” and thus laws
that compel speech impinge directly on our ability to communicate who we
are and what we value, laws that require the subsidization of speech do not
impinge the freedom of belief in the same way.326 First, there is less moral
content in the act of underwriting an activity than actually performing it
(consider, perhaps, some of your own investments).327 Second, the “mere act
of paying a mandatory assessment does not identify the payer with the message her payments help fund [and,] . . . [c]onsequently, the mere act of paying does not interfere with the dissenter’s ability to express her beliefs.”328
As to whether a subsidy implicates an individual’s freedom of speech,
Professor Klass observed that a required payment “is neither intended as a
communicative act nor understood as one.”329 We may look up someone’s
political contribution record and form opinions about him from candidates
to whom he had voluntarily donated, but we do not meet a public school
teacher and assume that because she is required to pay her agency fee we
know what her views are on class size, structured lay-offs, or the Common
Core Standards, nor even that she is a union member. Nor do we meet
fellow taxpayers and assume we are all in agreement on government policies
and priorities. In this context, a mandatory subsidy does not infringe on
one’s freedom of speech.330
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Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 513 (1958); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,
624 (1943).
See Klass, supra note 315, at 1089.
Id. at 1115.
Id. at 1115–16. The Court in Hobby Lobby functionally elided action and payment in holding that
the RFRA does not allow the Court “to say that [the asserted] religious beliefs are mistaken or
insubstantial.” Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2779 (2014).
Klass, supra note 315, at 1116–17.
Id. at 1124.
Id. In contrast, a voluntary payment may possess some value as symbolic speech. Id. at 1118 (citing
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)). For this reason, as I have argued in another venue, we should
recognize the First Amendment rights of both those who want to make voluntary donations and
those that feel coerced into doing so. See Mueller, supra note 286, at 1832–33 (arguing that while a
political donation may technically be voluntary, many contributors do not feel as though they can
say no and consequentially give far more than they otherwise would).
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Of course, this approach may well describe a golden era of First Amendment doctrine as it never actually existed.331 It also does not resolve many
difficult questions of line drawing and balancing. It does, however, lead us
away from an absolutist approach in which any infringement on speech or
one’s “freedom of belief” is cause to overturn a law or, in Sam’s case, prohibit
the compelled payment. It re-introduces nuance into the equation.332
For the Paycheck Problem, the result of a turn down this path would be,
to some extent, a return to status quo. Sam could not sue to opt out of paying
a portion of his taxes, and while he would not have to support his union’s
political activities so long as he remains not a member, he would still have to
pay his agency fee. The question of the pension contribution is more difficult,
however. Unless the Supreme Court truly backtracks and reverses Citizens
United, Sam’s mandatory contribution requires him to fund political activities
of a corporation, in effect supplementing the political funding preferences of
corporate directors.333 This is exactly what Abood banned in 1977 and, as
demonstrated above, the two contexts share significant overlap.334
B. The “Individual” Path
A second path would be to accept the autonomy interest that is driving
the Court’s current First Amendment jurisprudence, but to demand more
rigor in its application. As described above, the tax, union, and pension
schemes to which Sam objects do more than extract money from him. They
provide a benefit under terms in which others in the scheme—e.g., the union
and its members—cannot opt out of providing that benefit. None of these
are pure libertarian systems that one can exit without creating externalities.
This observation recently prompted Cynthia Estlund to propose that the
only way to ascertain the degree of First Amendment burden that one aspect
of labor laws—agency fees—places on an actor in the system is to consider
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Cf. P. Gorden Lippy, So, Mr. Trump, Exactly When Was America Great?, DAILY KOS (Sept. 7, 2015),
http://www.dailykos.com/story/2015/9/7/1419125/-So-Mr-Trump-exactly-when-was-America-great.
Cf. Laurence H. Tribe, Dividing Citizens United: The Case v. The Controversy, 30 CONST. COMMENT.
463, 493 (2015) (presenting “a plea for judicial open-mindedness, sensitivity to nuance, and a measure of old-fashioned humility”).
See Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 19, at 90 (“The basic problem arises from the fact that political
spending decisions may be a product not merely of a business judgment regarding the firm’s strategy, but also of the directors’ and executives’ own political preferences and beliefs. Political spending might often have consequences that are exogenous to the firm’s performance . . . .”).
In Citizens United the Court rejected as a compelling interest the potentially distorting impact of
accumulated wealth, but its discussion of the issue makes it clear that what it was really dismissing
was a compelling interest in leveling the campaign funding playing field. See Citizens United v.
FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 350 (2010). As demonstrated above and in the Court’s recent analysis in Harris,
Sam’s objection to his pension contribution is a liberty interest, not an equality interest.
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the challenged provision in the context of all the mutual benefits and obligations the law imposes.335 Professor Estlund focused her inquiry on the union
context, but her analysis bears on other areas of compelled subsidy as well.
She reasoned that “[u]nions are distinct constitutional actors governed by an
array of unusual rights, privileges, responsibilities and duties, the whole of
which ought to be considered in assessing a challenge to any of the parts.”336
This argument echoes Justice Scalia’s dissent in Lehnert, quoted above, but
with an important caveat: “Where he invokes the ‘free rider’ problem as a
‘compelling state interest’ justifying the agency fee requirement,” Estlund argues that “no significant constitutional infringement arises, and no compelling state interest need be identified, because the agency fee is offset and justified by the costs (to the union) and benefits (to the individual) of union
representation.”337 It is a value-for-money exchange.
Catherine Fisk and Margaux Poueymirou recently engaged in a similar
analysis, although rather than focusing on the standard of review, they argued that a proper balancing of First Amendment interests in agency fee
cases must account not only for the rights of dissenters, but also the First
Amendment rights of the union and its members.338 Even under a strict
scrutiny analysis, agency fees would pass constitutional muster because
they protect three sets of interests simultaneously: nonmembers from having
to subsidize the political and ideological pursuits of the union, union members from having to subsidize the political and ideological beliefs of nonmembers, and unions who strive to protect their workers’ interests and can
only do so when they are able to fully participate in the political landscape.339

These arguments suggest an autonomy-focused approach that would permit compelled subsidies only if two conditions are satisfied: first, the challenged payments are reasonably related to a regulatory scheme that provides
a benefit; and second, any opt-out would impact the expressive interests of
others bound in the scheme. Under this approach, expenditures with no
reasonable relation to the benefit provided, such as certain investments in
political activism, would be walled off from compulsory funding, but funding
for services that an entity is bound to provide and that offer a benefit to the
dissenter would be permissible. Conversely, if a dissenter could opt out of
receiving a benefit, he would be able to opt out of the compelled funding.
This point reinforces the conclusion that one cannot opt out of taxes; it is
impossible, after all, to avoid the benefits provided by government spending,
however much one might disagree with some of it.
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See Estlund, supra note 95, at 213.
Id. at 206.
Id. at 220.
Fisk & Poueymirou, supra note 28, at 442–43.
Id. at 491.
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As a descriptive and normative proposition, this approach is appealing. It
provides a better account of the forces at play in compelled subsidy cases, and
the various constitutional interests implicated, than the Court’s recent decisions
in this area. It also works with the Roberts Court’s focus on the First Amendment as a protector of individual autonomy, although it demands that the scope
of the inquiry be broadened to recognize all relevant autonomy interests.
Nevertheless, although it may satisfy the Court’s concern for autonomy interests, this proposal may be at odds with the Court’s current “absolutist” approach to First Amendment cases.340 With few exceptions, the Court seems to
be moving away from the kind of balancing approach suggested here, as demonstrated by its reliance on “corporate democracy” to dismiss concerns about dissenting shareholders in Citizens United and its disregard for the additional costs its
Hobby Lobby decision created for the government or employees. Relatedly, this
proposal is susceptible to the same criticism that animated Justice Breyer’s dissent
in United Foods: under it, the government might be more exposed to First Amendment challenges when it takes a light regulatory hand rather than when it enacts
comprehensive legislation binding others in a scheme.341
How would the Paycheck Problem resolve itself along this path? As noted
above, Sam would have no constitutional objection to taxes; he receives a
benefit from them and any exit is likely to create increased costs for others in
the system. Likewise the agency fee, which already excludes non-germane
political and ideological expenditures, would likely be viewed as an acceptable accommodation of the constitutional interests of the various parties involved. Pension contributions, however, would continue to be problematic
so long as corporations are allowed to make unlimited political expenditures.
Notwithstanding the Court’s holding in Citizens United that political dollars
need not be kept in a separate account of voluntary contributions, to the extent one conceives of a corporation as a group of individuals who have combined capital, the result in Citizens United clearly elevated the core First
Amendment interests of some members over others.342
One might imagine two responses under this approach defending the status quo and denying investors’ constitutional interests in how their money is
spent. First, one might argue that a corporation’s political spending decisions
340
341
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See supra notes 37–39.
United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 428 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (criticizing the
majority’s “unreasoned distinction between heavily regulated and less heavily regulated speakers”
because it “could lead to less First Amendment protection in that it would deprive the former of
protection”).
But see Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768 (2014) (“A corporation is simply a form
of organization used by human beings to achieve desired ends. An established body of law specifies
the rights and obligations of the people . . . who are associated with a corporation in one way or
another. When rights, whether constitutional or statutory, are extended to corporations, the purpose is to protect the rights of these people.”).
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are reasonably related to the benefit received by the investor. This is a debatable, fact-specific proposition that cannot be resolved here. Professors
Bebchuk and Jackson have offered several reasons that the political preferences (and spending) of a corporation’s directors might diverge from the
views of the shareholders and the interests of the company.343 One obvious
area of such divergence might be issues relating to corporate governance or
shareholder rights.344 For now it is enough to note that these arguments
would also open the door to allowing union agency fees to be used on political
spending on the same theory, upending the compromise struck in Street and
Abood.345 Second, one might argue, as the Court suggested in Lee, that an
employee agrees to fund corporate political speech when she enters into public employment and is required to make pension contributions. Again, this
raises symmetry issues with unions, especially where someone is hired into
an existing union shop. Even if it did not, history rebuts this account. Before
Citizens United, the last time corporations and unions could make independent
expenditures was 1947, long before pensions seriously invested in private
companies.346 It is highly improbable that any such trade-off was contemplated as a part of the pension scheme.
Last, to the extent the pension is a defined contribution plan as opposed to
a defined benefit plan—meaning that the benefit paid out correlates to the
money paid in—Sam may be able to opt out of his pension scheme, although
this would mean foregoing a significant earnings advantage. Opting out of a
union benefit is less feasible. An objecting police officer or teacher might theoretically be able to forego salary increases and health insurance improvements
negotiated by the union, but it would be more difficult to cordon her off from
negotiated employment conditions like vacation time, class size, hiring and firing seniority, and shift hours. Indeed, allowing an individual employee to reject the terms of collective bargaining would undermine the chief benefits employers receive from unions—namely, administrative convenience.347
C. The “Structural” Path
A final approach would build on the analysis above and re-frame the First
Amendment as protecting a larger constitutional system, one in which indi-
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Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 19, at 90.
Id. at 91.
See, e.g., Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 801 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
(arguing that in fact, unions’ “political side . . . is as organic, as inured a part of [their] philosophy
and practice . . . as their immediate bread-and-butter concerns”).
See United States v. Cong. of Indus. Orgs., 335 U.S. 106 (1948).
Transcript of Oral Argument at 39–50, Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n, 578 U.S. 1083 (2016)
(per curiam) (No. 14-915).
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vidual liberty is important but not always a “trump.” Even beyond compelled subsidy cases, many laws impede free will or require someone to indirectly support something with which she may disagree.348 If these were all
potential First Amendment violations, challenges to previously unobjectionable regulations would threaten to overrun the courts and, of greater concern, dilute the actual purpose of the First Amendment and the Constitution
it supports. We had been able to ignore the expansion of the autonomy interest in free speech jurisprudence because we had gatekeepers such as categories of speech and scrutiny levels that kept it in check. But if the Court is
going to shine a First Amendment light on all regulation, it may be time to
develop a more robust theory of the First Amendment.
This approach does not ignore the autonomy interests that undergird
much of the Court’s recent First Amendment jurisprudence. Rather, it recognizes that the Constitution’s preservation of individual autonomy is purposeful. We protect it because we value an individual’s participation in society and in the democratic process.349 The legitimacy of the constitutional
structure rests on the presumption that people will participate, both in the
selection of leaders and in the formation of public policy. Recognizing this
allows us to see that what we might call “exit” actions, such as Sam contemplates in the Paycheck Problem, pose unique First Amendment challenges in
that they not only question the legitimacy of the government to craft collective solutions to what are often collective action problems—the very purpose,
some would say, of government—but also force us to evaluate how our system of republican self-government can function if everyone can pick up their
metaphorical ball and go home.
Thinking systemically about the purpose of the Constitution is not a new
endeavor. Thirty years ago Owen Fiss proposed a “structural approach” in
which “the enrichment of public debate is substituted for the protection of
autonomy” as the impetus of the First Amendment, and “free speech operates as a justification rather than as a limit on state action.”350 More than
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See Post, supra note 29, at 210 (citing Banning v. Newdow, 14 Cal. Rptr. 3d 447 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004),
in which a father in a child custody dispute objected that an order requiring him to pay a portion
of the mother’s attorney’s fees violated his First Amendment right not to be compelled to fund
speech with which he disagreed).
See id. at 227 (“The interest of autonomy, which would be compromised by compulsory taxation[,] . . . does not well explain the configuration of existing or desirable First Amendment jurisprudence. The interest of participation in public debate, by contrast, . . . does have considerable
explanatory power . . . .”); cf. Paul D. Carrington, Our Imperial First Amendment, 34 U. RICH. L. REV.
1167, 1210 (2001) (“It is intolerable that the First Amendment, long treasured as an essential feature
of self-government, has been made by the Court into an instrument for the subordination of the
democratic process to government controlled by the highest bidders.”).
Fiss, supra note 46, at 1419.
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thirty years before that, Alexander Mieklejohn argued that the First Amendment did not protect an individual right so much as a system of self-government and political freedom; the First Amendment, he noted, does not state
that the government may not abridge speech, but “the freedom of speech.”351
More recently, in his book Citizens Divided, Robert Post suggested that the
twin pillars of the First Amendment are “democratic legitimation” and “discursive democracy”; in Citizens United, he posited, the Supreme Court had
erred in elevating the latter over the former.352
The purpose of the First Amendment will not be resolved here, nor does
it need to be. It is enough to re-direct our attention in the Paycheck Problem
to the structural issues it might pose. Under this approach, we worry about
compelled subsidies because they might skew either the political process or
public discourse in a way that contravenes the First Amendment’s purpose.
Taking a lead from Post’s analysis, the risk can further be broken down into
two separate concerns: first, that a compelled subsidy that is aggregated and
spent by another with whom one is not politically aligned on an election or
policy question might undermine the legitimacy of the political process; and
second, that a compelled subsidy spent to promote a particular public policy
might impact government decision-making in a way disproportionate to the
actual support for that policy, either because it drowns out dissenting voices
or because it does not leave sufficient alternate avenues for expression. To
collapse the inquiry back down to its essence: is the system sound, and can
you meaningfully participate in it?353
It bears noting that evaluating system integrity and meaningful participation in an electoral process may well have different touchstones than in public
discourse. There are reasons to more closely safeguard the former. First,
unlike public policy discussions, an election is not an adaptable, iterative process; once a vote happens, that choice is locked in for two, four, or six years.
Second, to the extent preventing corruption continues to be a government
interest, the personal stakes and, again, winner-take-all nature of elections
may make them more susceptible to manipulation. Third, our constitutional
expectations about the democratic process are different in the two cases. Our
right to vote is deeply personal and inalienable, and any manipulation of our
exercise of the franchise more directly impacts our interaction with our system of government than our views on various public policy issues, which we
process into a tapestry that may ultimately inform our vote. The courts, for
351
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MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 46, at 19.
POST, supra note 46, at 36; see also id. at 93 (concluding that “the Court in its recent campaign
finance cases has posed the wrong constitutional questions and has failed to consider the material
constitutional facts”).
See generally Robert Yablon, Voting, Spending, and the Right to Participate, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 655 (2017)
(re-conceptualizing voting and campaign finance cases under a proposed “right to participate”).
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example, recognize the value of equality in elections but have consistently
rejected its significance in campaign finance cases.354
Under this approach, Sam’s compelled payment of taxes would pass muster. In addition to the structural arguments raised above, it is worth noting
that taxes do not impinge his ability to fully participate the electoral process
in any way, and they pose only limited constraints on his ability to engage
with public discourse on matters of policy. Sam is still, as the lower courts
noted in an earlier tax resister case, “free to announce and publish” his opinions about matters of public concern.355 Indeed, to the extent that one will
not speak up unless inspired to do so by a message one opposes (consider
much of social media), it may be that the compulsion to pay taxes inspires
greater participation in public debate.
The case of Sam’s pension and union payments is, as noted above, different from his taxes as both corporations and unions are extra-constitutional;
they are not in themselves necessary for government. Nevertheless, in both
cases Sam’s objection to his payments rests on the fact that they fund expression likely to shape public discourse and political outcomes. Applying the
structural line of analysis, a court would be tasked with considering whether
assessment unduly skews either process. One way to approach this might be
a test with two prongs: first, is the assessment itself protected by meaningful
safeguards; and second, does the assessment compromise the dissenter’s ability to meaningfully participate in the electoral process or in public discourse?
The devil is of course in the details, but we can think in broad terms about
how this might play out in the Paycheck Problem. As to the first question, the
democratic safeguards are more robust in the union context than in the pension one. Union shops can only be formed once a majority of employees vote
to do so, all represented employees are permitted to join as voting members,
and any employee—union member or not—can speak in school board meetings and in public about matters of policy.356 If anything, the fact that dissenting members may opt out of full union membership allows them to telegraph
a message of disapproval to both the union officers and to their employers
about the union’s activities and positions. Further, agency fees can only be
spent for limited purposes, for which the union must provide an accounting.
Political contributions remain voluntary. As discussed above, none of these
safeguards are available in the pension context. Even if members of the state
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Compare Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120, 1130 (2016) (reaffirming the principle of “one-person,
one-vote”), with McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1450 (2014) (“No matter how desirable it
may seem, it is not an acceptable governmental objective to ‘level the playing field’ . . . .”).
Kahn v. United States, 753 F.2d 1208, 1216–17 (1985).
Madison Joint Sch. Dist. No. 8 v. Wis. Emp’t Relations Comm’n, 429 U.S. 167 (1976).
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pension board have political accountability, there are no avenues for participation by investors. As seen in the discussion of “corporate democracy” above,
in fact “a core goal of corporate law is to give directors and officers legal authority to act in ways with which shareholders may profoundly disagree.”357
As to the second question—does the assessment impede a dissenter’s ability to participate—here too the union fees raise fewer concerns. This is due
in part to the fact that, in contrast to those making mandatory pension contributions, no one can be compelled to fund unions’ non-germane political
activity. (A dissenting employee might argue that they could better use their
agency fees for advocacy if they did not have to direct them to their union,
but again pensions would implicate similar if not greater concerns, as pension
contributions are typically far higher than agency fees.358) Indeed, under any
of the approaches proposed here, the asymmetry between union and corporate political spending remains an untenable problem. It is particularly acute
in an environment where public-private partnerships, quasi-public regulatory bodies, and corporate strategies to grow profits not through the markets
but via government engagement are more and more present. 359
Further, while neither the union nor pension contributions prevent anyone
from speaking out in public, corporate investments suffer from a lack of disclosure, making it difficult for an investor to recognize when speech on a particular issue is warranted. It is not unusual for individuals to decide to engage in
public debate only upon learning about controversial statements or events that
merit a response. If we cannot identify these—and currently the SEC does not
require corporations to disclose political spending—then it is hard to say that
the ability to participate is meaningful. For reasons discussed above, the lack
of transparency and exit rights is particularly troubling in the political context,
but it also has implications for a corporation’s other expressive activities and
may give a constitutional dimension to calls for greater disclosure.
CONCLUSION
The Paycheck Problem provides as a framework to consider the trajectory of the Court’s recent First Amendment cases and its implications for the
government’s ability to craft collective solutions to systemic problems. We
live in an increasingly interdependent and interconnected society. Yet as
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Corporate Law Professors’ Brief, supra note 181, at 7.
See supra note 258.
See, e.g., John C. Coates IV & Ron Fein, Corporations Are Perverting the Notion of Free Speech, NEWSWEEK
(Aug. 4, 2015), http://www.newsweek.com/corporations-are-perverting-notion-free-speech359785 (“Companies increasingly place bets not on technological innovation but on legal and political
‘innovation’—what business schools teach under the Orwellian name ‘non-market strategies.’ As
corporate success shifts toward extracting wealth via the political and judicial systems, career advancement will depend on learning the levers of power in courts, legislatures and regulatory agencies, and different skills and forms of ‘talent’ will be rewarded.”).

Feb. 2018]

THE PAYCHECK PROBLEM

629

movements from school choice to Brexit demonstrate, the question of when
an individual should have the right to exercise an exit strategy is only going
to become more pressing in the coming decades. The Supreme Court’s compelled subsidy cases raise issues that are central to our concepts of self-determination, governmental power, and social structures, and they provide guidance as to how we should respond when any of these constructs come into
conflict. This makes it all the more unfortunate that this area of jurisprudence has also been one of the Court’s least consistent. The analysis above
illustrates several serious shortcomings with the Supreme Court’s current approach to compelled subsidy of speech cases, including a failure to recognize
the implications of its recent union jurisprudence for cases arising in the corporate context, an overemphasis on the First Amendment’s role protecting
individual autonomy, an undifferentiated expansion of the First Amendment
“penumbra,” and a blurring of the line the Court has long marked between
money and speech. With a new Justice on the Court, it is time to identify a
path forward that can bring more coherence to a disorganized but vitally
important body of law.360
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As this Article was in the final stage of preparation for publication, the Supreme Court heard arguments in Janus v. AFSCME. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 134. Due to publication
constraints, I was not able to give full consideration to this case throughout this Article. However,
the oral argument indicated little to change the analysis in this Article, nor did it suggest that any
Justice has altered his or her views since the Court deadlocked on Friedrichs. The tensions noted in
this Article among the Court’s various lines of compelled subsidy jurisprudence went entirely unexplored. No one mentioned the Court's ruling in Citizens United upholding the use of corporate of
general treasury funds for political advertisements, and in fact the author of that opinion, Justice
Kennedy, appeared to disfavor the union, admonishing State Respondent’s counsel that, “What
we’re talking about here is . . . compelled subsidization of a private party, a private party that expresses political views constantly.” Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 134, at 36. Justice
Gorsuch, who will likely be the swing vote, said nothing during the argument.
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